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In many developing countries, the food retail sector is rapidly modernizing. With rising urban 
middle classes, supermarkets are increasingly replacing wet markets and other traditional 
retail outlets as the preferred place of food purchases. These shifts in the food retail sector 
also have implications for agricultural supply chains. While in smaller towns supermarkets 
primarily focus on the sales of processed foods, in larger cities they offer their customers a 
variety of fresh fruits and vegetables. In order to manage regular supply of fresh and high-
quality produce, supermarkets often do not rely on wholesale markets alone but also contract 
farmers directly. In many countries, such supermarket contracts also involve smallholder 
farmers. 
The existing literature shows that the rapid expansion of supermarkets in developing countries 
can provide interesting new marketing opportunities for smallholder farmers. Smallholder 
farmers, who make up the majority of the rural poor, can benefit from supplying supermarkets 
through higher and more stable prices, as well as better access to information and technology. 
Hence, the expansion of supermarkets may potentially contribute to poverty reduction and 
rural development. However, available impact studies show mixed results. While a few 
studies confirm positive effects of supermarket contracting on farm productivity and 
household incomes in the small farm sector, others find that marginalized farms are unable to 
participate in supermarket channels due to technical, financial, or other types of constraints. 
Smallholder farmers who manage to overcome these constraints often benefit significantly. 
However, their participation in supermarket contracts is dynamic, with high drop-out rates 
observed over time. 
Against this background, this dissertation entails two essays that cover two key questions (i) 
what types of supermarket contracts do smallholder farmers prefer? And (ii) what are the 
effects of smallholder participation in supermarket channels on household income and diets? 
For the first question, inclusion and successful participation of smallholders seem to depend 
on contractual design. This is difficult to analyze based on observational data alone, because 
variations in contractual design rarely occur in the same setting. In the second chapter of this 
dissertation, we address this research and knowledge gap using a choice experiment that we 
carried out with smallholder farmers in Kenya in 2015. For the second question, one 
shortcoming of the existing research is that most studies used cross-sectional data, making the 
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identification of causal effects difficult. A few studies used panel data, but only looked at 
purely economic effects. We contribute to the literature by using two rounds of panel data to 
examine the effects of smallholder participation in supermarket channel on household income 
and diets as elucidated in the third chapter of this dissertation. 
Addressing the two knowledge gaps would be beneficial in understanding the types of 
contracts that facilitate smallholder participation in such high value channels as supermarkets, 
and in unravelling the welfare effects of supermarket contracting on farm households in terms 
of income and diets. Recent statistics show that 800 million people suffer from hunger and 
another 2 billion suffer from micronutrient malnutrition. The prevalence of undernourishment 
and micronutrient malnutrition is high among the rural populations that are also largely 
smallholder farmers. Hence, our study is relevant in the context of assessing the welfare 
effects of supermarket contracting on smallholder farmers. We focus on supermarket 
contracts with smallholders in Kenya as one of the countries with the fastest growth of 
supermarkets in Sub-Saharan Africa. Currently, supermarkets accounts for 10% of national 
grocery sales in Kenya and the share is projected to grow with increased urbanization. 
The first essay in chapter two entails a discussion of the choice experiment results on 
vegetable farmers’ preferences for supermarket contracts. We used D-optimal design to 
design the choice cards where we varied design attributes of contracts with supermarkets and 
other traders to examine farmers’ contractual preferences and how they vary with 
socioeconomic characteristics. The five attributes included were; output price for the 
vegetables sold, place of sale, form of sale, timing of sale, and payment mode. We then 
specified and estimated mixed logit models to account for preference heterogeneity and 
finally calculated farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) output price changes for certain 
contract attributes.  
The results show that farmers generally prefer supplying traditional marketing channels 
without a contract. Farmers that currently supply traditional channels are more contract-averse 
than either the current or previous supermarket suppliers. Farmers that recently entered the 
supermarket channel have significantly more positive attitudes towards contracting. The 
results further underscore the importance of contract transparency, and trust between farmers 
and buyers. Supermarkets contracts usually involve delayed payments but this has evolved 
over time from payment based on quantities delivered to payments based on actual sales to 
consumers, without a proper monitoring mechanism. This involves different types of risk. The 
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results indicate that farmers would accept significantly lower prices if they were either paid 
based on quantities delivered or if they had an option to verify actual customer sales. Farmers’ 
contractual preferences are also influenced by socioeconomic variables such as age and level 
of education of household head, and income levels. 
The second essay in chapter 3 discusses the effects of supermarket contracting on household 
income and diets. We focus on household dietary diversity, consumption of calories, zinc, 
iron, and vitamin A as dietary indicators. Data on household food consumption were collected 
using 7–day recalls and conversion made using food conversion tables for Kenya. We 
estimated fixed effects and random effects models for panel data analysis.  The results show 
that supplying supermarkets has increased farm household income by 66%. Supermarket 
contracts also contribute to higher levels of dietary diversity, calorie consumption and zinc 
consumption. We do not find significant effects on vitamin A and iron consumption. Using 
the estimated dietary effects for simple simulations suggests that wider participation of 
farmers in supermarket channels could help to reduce the prevalence of undernourishment by 
8% and zinc deficiency by 12%.   
The final chapter of this dissertation concludes by presenting a summary of the key findings 
and the policy implications, limitations of the study and suggestions for future research. We 
conclude that designing contracts with; lower transaction costs, more transparent quality 
grading system, sales verification mechanisms, and fairer risk-sharing arrangements could 
enhance smallholder participation in supermarket channels and other emerging high-value 
markets. Group marketing by farmers could be an interesting option to reduce individual risks 
and transaction costs.  Infrastructural and institutional improvements could also facilitate 
smallholder access to high-value markets. Further, supplying supermarket channels increases 
household incomes and improves diets. In summary, smallholder participation in high value 
chains such as supermarkets is worthwhile and efforts towards facilitating their engagement 
would not only contribute to poverty reduction, but also to more economic and social 
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1 General Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Globalization has expanded trade in fresh and processed foods across countries, courtesy of 
trade liberalization policies by various countries in the past few decades (Swinnen et al., 
2011). Increased trade has also resulted in food safety and quality concerns particularly in 
developed countries (Unnevehr, 2000; Codron et al., 2005; Swinnen et al., 2015). 
Consequently, numerous public and private food safety and quality standards have emerged to 
govern food trade, with far-reaching implications in the food marketing systems worldwide 
(Jaffee and Masakure, 2005; Okello and Swinnton, 2007; Asfaw et al., 2009). Another 
striking consequence is the globalization of agri-food systems, the increased integration of 
food value chains, and the remarkable spread of supermarkets in many developing countries 
in Central America, Asia, and Africa (Berdegué and Balsevich, 2005; Traill, 2006;  Reardon 
et al., 2012).  
In some developing countries, supermarkets are gradually replacing traditional markets as 
preferred shopping points particularly for fresh fruit and vegetables (FFVs). This is 
occasioned by rapid urbanization, rising incomes and middle classes, and changes in taste and 
preferences of consumers that also value convenience (Reardon et al., 2003; Richie et al., 
2015; Tschirley et al., 2015; Qaim, 2017). Population that is more affluent also view fresh 
foods sold in supermarkets as better in terms of safety and quality. The welfare impacts of the 
supermarket growth in developing countries have been analyzed in two broad perspectives. 
One strand of literature focuses on supermarkets’ contribution to the nutrition transition in 
developing countries through consumer purchases of diverse and relatively cheaper foods 
(Asfaw, 2008; Popkin et al., 2012; Popkin, 2014; Kimenju et al., 2015; Umberger et al., 
2015).  
Another strand of literature concentrates on how supermarket growth has contributed to 
economic welfare of smallholder farmers that are contracted by supermarkets for the supply 
of fresh produce. Our study contributes to the latter strand of literature. Existing studies have 
analyzed the drivers of smallholder participation in high-value channels including 
supermarkets (Reardon et al., 2003; Codron et al., 2004; Traill, 2006). Findings show that 
resource constrained smallholder farmers may be excluded from high-value channels due to 
stringent consistency, quality, timeliness, and volumetric requirements exerted by 
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supermarkets as an example (Berdegué et al., 2005; Hernández et al., 2007; Andersson et al., 
2015).  
Supplying supermarket channels require substantial on-farm investment in modern 
technologies (e.g. seeds, crop chemicals, and irrigation) and post-harvest handling equipment 
to fulfil contractual obligations. For smallholders, access to these inputs and technologies also 
hinges on access to credit which is limited in many developing countries (Narayanana and 
Gulati, 2002; Giné and Yang, 2009). Hence, smallholder access to markets is impeded by 
institutional failures and market imperfections that lead to high transportation and transaction 
costs, aspects that are evident in high-value chains (Alene et al., 2008; Escobal et al., 2012).  
The types of contracts offered to farmers may also influence participation in contractual 
arrangements. Contracts usually involve delayed payments, which may be a problem to cash-
strapped households that require cash proceeds for income and consumption smoothing 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). Depending on the context, contracts could also unfavorably 
shift substantial marketing risks to farmers thereby impeding participation in high value 
channels (Abebe et al., 2013; Ochieng et al., 2017). 
Smallholder farmers that overcome the hurdles benefit significantly from supplying high 
value chains. Studies have shown various positive welfare effects of contracting with 
supermarkets on crop productivity and smallholder investment in modern farm technologies 
(Berdegué et al., 2005; Neven et al., 2009; Rao et al., 2012). This leads to greater production 
capacities to consistently supply high-value channels. Supplying supermarkets has also 
generated on-farm and off-farm labor employment (Neven et al., 2009; Rao and Qaim, 2013). 
In the case of labor intensive crops, labor-constrained households often hire extra labor to 
supplement family labor. Such employment opportunities provide incomes that stimulate 
growth of the rural economy, given that the bulk of expenditures of rural folks are on food 
and basic non-luxuries largely produced locally (Hazel et al., 2010; Wiggins et al., 2010).  
Supplying supermarkets also increases farm profits and overall household income (Balsevich 
et al., 2003; Rao and Qaim, 2011; Chege et al., 2015). This stems from higher and more stable 
prices together with market assurance, aspects that can all contribute to further increase farm 
investment (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). For rural farm households, a high proportion of their 
income is spent on food (Alston et al., 1995). Studies show that higher household incomes 
facilitate improved household dietary diversity (quality) through access to diverse nutritious 
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foods as well as micronutrients intake (von Braun., 1994; Chege et al., 2015). This is more 
pronounced in cases of well-functioning food markets (Jones et al., 2014).  
Nutrition effects of supermarket contracting should be interpreted with caution because it is 
context specific and depends on the type of contracted crop, which may result in changes in 
gender roles in the marketing of the crops and use of sales proceeds. Studies show that in 
some cases, as crops that were considered “women’s crops” increasingly get commercialized, 
men take over control of revenues (von Braun, 1994; Fischer and Qaim, 2012), much to the 
detriment of household nutrition (Chege et al., 2015). Against this background, this 
dissertation presents findings from our study that covers two broad objectives highlighted 
below.     
                                               
1.2 Research Problem and Objectives 
In spite of the extant literature on the positive welfare effects of supermarket contracting on 
smallholder farm households, smallholder participation in supermarket channel remains 
limited and dynamic with high drop-out rates observed. This could be partly attributed to the 
contract design. However, little is known about farmers’ preferences for supermarket 
contracts and design attributes. Also, many studies that analyze the welfare effects of 
smallholder participation in supermarket channels use cross-section data (Berdegué et al., 
2005; Miyata et al., 2009; Neven et al., 2009; Rao and Qaim, 2011; Chege et al., 2015) that is 
plagued with endogeneity issues, making it difficult to draw causal inferences. A few panel 
data studies (that reduce problems with unobserved heterogeneity) largely focus on economic 
welfare alone (Michelson, 2013; Andersson et al., 2015). Except for Chege et al (2015), 
hardly any study has analyzed the effect of supplying supermarkets on farm household 
nutrition or diets, and the work by Chege et al (2015) is based on cross-section data only. 
This dissertation, which comprises two substantive essays, addresses the knowledge gaps 
about contractual design, farmers’ preferences for contracts, and broader welfare effects of 
supermarkets in the small farm sector. In the first essay, we use choice experimental data 
collected from a sample of vegetable farmers in Central Kenya to assess farmers’ preferences 
for contracts and contract design attributes. These important aspects illuminate the reasons for 
dynamic participation in high-value channels involving marketing contracts. In the second 
essay, we use panel data models (fixed effects and random effects) to examine the association 
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between supplying supermarkets and farm household income and diets. This is also important, 
given the high prevalence of undernourishment and micronutrients malnutrition in developing 
countries that largely affect poor farm households. 
Considering the participation dynamics in the supermarket channel as observed over the 
years, it is important to understand the underlying problems with the existing contractual 
arrangements, and the households’ welfare implications of supplying supermarkets over time. 
The broad objectives of the study are to analyze smallholder farmers’ preference for 
supermarket contracts in Kenya and to examine the effects of contracting on farmers’ incomes 
and household diets. The dietary indicators used are; household dietary diversity and 
quantities of calories and micronutrients (zinc, iron and vitamin A) consumed per adult 
equivalent and day. The specific objectives are as follows: 
1 To analyze farmers’ preferences for supermarket contracts in general, 
2 To analyze farmers’ preferences for contract design attributes, 
3 To analyze  the effects of supermarket contracting on household income, and 
4 To analyze the effects of supermarket contracting on household diets. 
 
1.3 Data Collection 
The aforementioned objectives are analyzed using panel data collected over several years.  
Multi-stage sampling procedure was used in 2008 to sample 402 vegetable farmers from 4 
main vegetable producing divisions of the former Kiambu District (Rao and Qaim, 2011). 
From the 4 divisions, 31 locations were purposely selected using information on vegetable 
production from the former Kiambu District agricultural office. Farmers were then selected 
from each of the locations using simple random sampling procedure. A follow-up survey was 
conducted in 2012 with few replacements. In total, 384 farmers were surveyed in 2012 
(Chege et al., 2015). Another follow-up survey was conducted with few replacements in 2015, 
whereby 409 farmers were sampled (Ochieng et al., 2015). 
Regarding my role in the data collection process, I conducted the third round of survey in 
2015, where in addition to the 2012 questionnaire,  I designed and implemented a choice 
experiment to analyze the first two objectives on farmers’ preferences for supermarket 
contracts. The extended questionnaire and choice experiment protocol are in the general 
appendix of this dissertation. The 2008 data are combined with those of subsequent survey 
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rounds to analyze the effects of supermarket participation on household income in a panel 
regression framework (objective 3). It should be noted that dietary related data were only 
collected in 2012 and 2015 survey rounds. Hence, objective 4 is analyzed using only 2012 and 
2015 data. 
1.4 Dissertation Outline 
The rest of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 presents an essay on farmers’ preferences 
for supermarket contracts where the results for the choice experiment are discussed (the first 
two objectives). This is followed by chapter 3 that discusses the effects of supermarket 
contracting on household income and diets (the last two objectives). Chapter 4 presents the 
general conclusion by summarizing the main findings, policy implications, limitations of the 

















2 Farmers’ Preferences for Supermarket Contracts in Kenya1 
 
Abstract  
With the modernization of global agri-food systems, the role of contract farming increases. 
This also involves smallholder farmers in developing countries. While previous studies have 
looked at economic impacts of contract schemes on smallholder farmers, little is known about 
farmers’ preferences for contracting in general, and for specific contract design attributes in 
particular. Better understanding farmers’ preferences and constraints is important to make 
smallholder contract schemes more viable and beneficial. This article builds on a choice 
experiment to analyze farmers’ preferences and preference heterogeneity for contracts in 
Kenya. In the study region, supermarkets use contracts to source fresh vegetables directly 
from preferred suppliers. However, farmer dropout rates are high. Mixed logit models are 
estimated to examine farmers’ attitudes towards critical contract design attributes. Having to 
deliver their harvest to urban supermarkets is costly; hence farmers require a significant 
output price premium. Farmers also dislike delayed payments that are commonplace in 
contract schemes. The most problematic contract attribute is related to unpredictable product 
rejection rates, substantially adding to farmers’ risk. Designing contracts with lower 
transaction costs, more transparent quality grading, and fairer risk-sharing arrangements could 
enhance smallholder participation in supermarket procurement channels.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
With the modernization of global agri-food systems, the role of contract farming increases 
(Wang et al., 2014; Otsuka et al., 2016). This also involves farmers in developing countries. 
Export or processing companies often source agricultural products through outgrower 
schemes, in order to ensure consistent and high-quality supply (Barrett et al., 2012; 
Dedehouanou et al., 2013; Rosch and Ortega, 2014; Bellemare and Novak, 2016). Also in 
domestic supply chains in developing countries, the role of contracting increases. Rising 
urban middle classes have higher preferences for food quality and convenience. As a result, 
                                                          
1 This chapter was published as: Ochieng, D.O., Veettil, P.C., Qaim, M., 2017. Farmers’ preferences for 





modern supermarkets are gaining market shares in retailing (Reardon and Timmer, 2014; 
Rischke et al., 2015). Especially for fresh and perishable products, supermarkets often do not 
rely on traditional wholesale markets but procure directly from farmers through contracts 
(Rao et al., 2011; Michelson et al., 2012; Trebbin, 2014). 
Contract farming arrangements in general, and supermarket contracts in particular, can 
provide new marketing opportunities for smallholder farmers in developing countries. 
Contracted smallholders may benefit from higher and more stable prices, as well as better 
access to inputs, technology, and information (Berdegué et al., 2005; Sartorius and Kirsten, 
2007; Blandon et al., 2009a; Barrett et al., 2012; Reardon and Timmer, 2014). Indeed, recent 
studies showed that supermarket contracts have contributed to higher farm productivity and 
household welfare in some smallholder situations (Minten et al., 2009; Rao and Qaim, 2011; 
Rao et al., 2012; Michelson, 2013; Chege et al., 2015). However, studies also showed that 
smallholders are sometimes unable to participate in supermarket channels (Hernández et al., 
2007; Neven et al., 2009), or they drop out of contracts for reasons that are not always entirely 
clear (Andersson et al., 2015). To some extent, the inability to participate can be explained by 
lack of human and financial capital. But unfavorable contract design may also play an 
important role (Schipmann and Qaim, 2011; Otsuka et al., 2016). Better adjusting contract 
design to the particular needs and constraints could help to make contract farming more viable 
for smallholders. 
Relatively little is known about how variations in contract design affect smallholder 
participation and socioeconomic impacts. This is difficult to analyze with purely 
observational data, because variations in contract design rarely occur in the same setting. A 
few recent studies used randomized field experiments to analyze effects of changing contract 
design in existing schemes (Saenger et al., 2013; Saenger et al., 2014). Field experiments are 
costly, so implementing a larger number of experimental treatments – which would be 
required to evaluate changes in multiple contract design attributes – is hardly possible. 
Choice experiments are less costly to implement than field experiments and have been used in 
recent studies to analyze smallholder preferences for contracts and particular contract terms 
and provisions. These studies evaluated preferences for hypothetical contract attributes related 
to output price and quality levels, the need for upfront investments, and the provision of 
training, credit, and inputs through the contracting company, among others (Blandon et al., 
2009b; Schipmann and Qaim, 2011; Bellemare, 2012; Abebe et al., 2013). None of these 
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studies looked at supermarket contracts, which often differ from those of export or processing 
companies. For instance, due to higher food quality and food safety standards in export 
markets, contracts in the export sector often involve strict regulations on the type of 
production technology to use (Okello and Swinton, 2007; Asfaw et al., 2010; Maertens et al., 
2012). 
 As part of the contracts, export and processing companies sometimes also provide credit, 
inputs, and extension services to farmers. In those cases, farmers are usually not allowed to 
side-sell their harvest to other buyers (Rosch and Ortega, 2014). Contracts with domestic 
supermarkets are often less stringent on production technology. Inputs and credit are rarely 
provided, so that side-selling is usually not prohibited (Hernandez et al., 2007; Minten et al., 
2009; Rao and Qaim, 2011). These differences may affect farmers’ willingness and ability to 
participate in contract schemes. 
We add to the literature by analyzing farmers’ preferences for supermarket contracts in 
Kenya, using data from a choice experiment. We specifically look at a sample of smallholder 
vegetable producers that was surveyed over many years. Some of these farmers supply 
vegetables to supermarkets under contract while others sell their vegetables in traditional spot 
markets. Some farmers in the sample also had a supermarket contract in the past, but decided 
to switch back to supplying traditional markets. We hypothesize that the low rates of contract 
participation may be related to certain contract terms and provisions that are difficult to meet 
or simply disliked by farmers. This is tested by examining farmers’ marketing choices with 
hypothetical variations in contract design.  
We also analyze the relative importance of different contract attributes by computing farmers’ 
willingness to accept for each attribute level. Mixed logit models are estimated to account for 
preference heterogeneity. Choice experiments, like other approaches used to elicit stated 
preferences, are often associated with hypothetical bias (Hensher et al., 2005). Building on a 
sample of farmers with actual contract experience and using variations from existing contracts 





2.2 Supermarket Contracts in Kenya 
Kenya ranks second after South Africa in terms of growth and expansion of supermarkets in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Planet Retail, 2016). Supermarkets account for about 10% of total food 
retailing in Kenya with a growing trend. In Nairobi and other big cities, the supermarket share 
is already much higher (Chege et al., 2015). As in other developing countries (Reardon and 
Timmer, 2014), modern supermarkets in Kenya started their business in major cities but more 
recently opened stores in smaller towns as well (Rischke et al., 2015). The most widespread 
supermarket chains in Kenya include Nakumatt, Uchumi, Tuskys, Naivas, and Ukwala, all of 
which are Kenyan owned. The spread of foreign-owned supermarket chains in Kenya has 
been limited up till now (Planet Retail, 2016).  
Supermarket stores in smaller towns so far primarily sell processed foodstuffs. Many of the 
stores in bigger cities also have a large fresh food section, where a variety of fruits and 
vegetables is sold. Urban consumers often associate fruits and vegetables bought in modern 
supermarkets with higher quality, food safety, and freshness than products bought in 
traditional markets. On average, fresh products are also more expensive in supermarkets than 
in traditional markets. Supermarkets tend to place much emphasis on consistent supply and 
good outward appearance of fresh fruits and vegetables. As traditional wholesale markets are 
not sufficiently reliable in this respect, many of the fresh products are procured directly from 
farmers through contractual arrangements (Neven et al., 2009). Typically, farmers have to 
deliver their harvest directly to the supermarket stores. The produce has to be cleaned by 
farmers before delivery; leafy vegetables also have to be sorted and bundled ready for 
supermarket shelves (Rao and Qaim, 2013). Supermarket procurement officers occasionally 
visit contracted farmers to inspect production and post-harvest handling activities. 
This study focuses on farmers in Kiambu County, Central Kenya, not far from the capital city 
of Nairobi. These farmers have a long tradition of growing vegetables, notably green leafy 
ones (kale etc.) for the domestic market. Some of the farmers have marketing contracts with 
supermarkets in Nairobi whereas others sell the same type of vegetables in traditional 
markets, mostly to traders at the farm gate or in the village. Contracts only refer to the sales of 
vegetables and do not involve any provision of credit or inputs. Contracts stipulate the 
quantity of vegetables that a farmer has to deliver to a particular supermarket store on 
specified dates (Rao and Qaim, 2011). Farmers who are unable to deliver as scheduled are 
subsequently struck off the list of preferred suppliers and lose their contract. 
10 
  
Beyond the quantities agreed, contracted farmers can sell their vegetables in traditional 
markets. However, as farmers in Kiambu are small-scale producers, they rarely have 
significant excess quantities. In other words, contracted farmers sell most of their vegetables 
to supermarkets (Chege et al., 2015). Sometimes, they even collect vegetables from 
neighboring farms in order to meet the agreed quantities. The average quantity of vegetables 
sold per transaction is relatively small and does not differ much between supermarket and 
traditional marketing channels. However, in supermarket channels the frequency of 
transactions tends to be higher and deliveries have to be made on specified dates. Payments 
for vegetables delivered to supermarkets are delayed by one or two weeks. In traditional 
markets, farmers can sell whenever they want, and buyers pay immediately. 
The prices for vegetables sold to supermarkets are higher and more stable than those typically 
obtained in traditional markets, which is why supermarket contracts are attractive for farmers 
(Rao and Qaim, 2011). In principle, any farmer can get a contract when he/she is able to 
supply certain quantities on a regular basis and deliver to the supermarket stores in Nairobi. 
Meeting these conditions is easier for farmers with advanced irrigation equipment and good 
access to public or private transportation (Rao et al., 2012). Most of the contracts are made 
between supermarkets and individual farmers, but in some cases farmer groups are also 
contracted. Collective action can help farmers to coordinate their supplies and reduce 
transportation and transaction costs.  
As mentioned, farmers lose their contract when they are unable to deliver the agreed 
quantities to supermarkets according to schedule. Contracted farmers, on the other hand, 
sometimes complain about longer-than-expected payment delays or quantities rejected by 
supermarkets due to issues with product freshness or cleanliness (Andersson et al., 2015). In 
the contracts, specifications about product quality remain relatively vague. 
The contracts do not differ systematically between different supermarket chains. However, 
contractual details have evolved over time. We have observed contractual arrangements 
between supermarkets and farmers in Kiambu since 2008. In the beginning, contracted 
farmers had fixed delivery dates. In subsequent years, supermarkets have gradually shifted 
away from a fixed schedule towards placing orders with contracted farmers through phone 
calls a few days prior to required delivery. Furthermore, the payment mode has changed.  
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Initially farmers were paid for the actual quantities of vegetables delivered to supermarkets. 
Quantities not meeting the quality requirements were rejected, but this was a relatively 
predictable process. Rejected quantities could then be sold in traditional markets. More 
recently, farmers are no longer paid for the quantities delivered, but for the quantity the 
supermarket was able to sell to its customers. This means that most of the supermarket’s 
marketing risk is transferred to farmers. Quantities not sold by supermarkets can be traced 
back to individual farmers through small color codes on the vegetable bundles. Farmers can 
take the unsold quantities back if they wish, but this requires additional tours to the 
supermarket stores to pick up withered vegetables that can hardly be sold elsewhere. 
In spite of these changes, participation in supermarket contracts was shown to remain 
economically beneficial for farmers in Kiambu (Andersson et al., 2015). Nevertheless, 
deteriorating contractual terms may be one reason for the high dropout rates observed. As will 
be shown below, many farmers who had supermarket contracts in the past reverted to the 
traditional market. Focus group discussions revealed that this was often based on the farmers’ 
own decisions rather than losing contracts unintentionally. Our choice experiment builds on 
these existing and evolving contracts to better understand farmers’ preferences and 
constraints. 
 
2.3 Materials and Methods 
2.3.1 Sample of Farmers 
This study builds on a sample of vegetable farmers from Kiambu County, Central Kenya. The 
sample was selected in 2008 through a stratified random sampling procedure (Rao and Qaim, 
2011; Rao et al., 2012). Supermarket (SM) and traditional channel (TC) farmers were 
randomly selected from complete lists in 31 administrative locations within the County. A 
total of 402 farmers were selected in 2008. These farmers were surveyed in 2008, 2012, and 
2015. A few farmer replacements were necessary over time due to sample attrition. By 2015, 
we had 409 farmers in the sample. Sample descriptive statistics are provided below. The 





Data were collected through face-to-face interviews using a structured questionnaire. We 
captured details of vegetable production and marketing, as well as other farm and off-farm 
economic activities of the households. The interviews were conducted in the local language 
with the household head or another household member who was responsible for vegetable 
production and marketing. The 2015 survey also included a choice experiment, details of 
which are provided below. 
Figure 2.1 shows that the number of farmers supplying supermarkets and traditional channels 
changed remarkably between 2008 and 2015. The number of contracted supermarket 
suppliers more than halved between 2008 and 2012, and then again increased somewhat by 
2015. However, those who dropped out of the supermarket channel by 2012 are mostly not 
the same as those who joined the supermarket channel after 2012. Out of the 409 farmers in 
2015, 281 (69%) had never supplied supermarkets. In the following analysis, we refer to these 
281 farmers as TC stayers. Only 34 farmers in the sample (8%) had supplied supermarkets 
during the entire period 2008-2015 (SM stayers), 56 farmers (14%) had a supermarket 
contract in 2008 but dropped out in subsequent years (SM dropouts), while 38 farmers (9%) 
had not supplied supermarkets in 2008, but decided to enter the supermarket channel through 
a contract in subsequent years (SM newcomers). 
 
 
















2.3.2 Choice Experimental Approach 
Choice experiments have become a standard tool to evaluate the preferences of respondents 
with respect to hypothetical goods or services and are widely used in consumer research and 
environmental economics (Hensher et al., 2005; Louviere et al., 2010; Veettil et al., 2011). 
Recently, choice experiments have also gained popularity in an agricultural market context. A 
few recent studies have used choice experiments to assess marketing preferences of 
smallholder farmers in developing countries (Blandon et al., 2009b; Schipmann and Qaim, 
2011; Bellemare, 2012; Gelaw et al., 2016; Vassalos et al., 2016). 
Choice experiments are grounded on the microeconomic theory of consumer behavior and 
random utility theory (Lancaster, 1966; McFadden and Zarembka, 1974). It is assumed that 
consumers derive utility from the characteristics (attributes) of a good rather than the good 
itself. Individuals are assumed to choose alternatives that yield the highest utility among the 
range of available options. The actual choices observed thus provide useful insights into the 
underlying utility functions. In the context of this study, the “goods” are supermarket 
contracts with varying contract design attributes. In the experiment, a farmer can choose 
between i different contract options. Farmer’s utility for a particular contract option is 
composed of observable and unobservable parts: 
𝑉𝑖
𝑗 = 𝑉(𝑨𝒊, 𝑭𝒊
𝒋
) + 𝑖
𝑗  (1) 
where the observable component, 𝑉(𝑨𝒊, 𝑭𝒊
𝒋
) is a function of 𝑨𝒊 , a vector of design attributes 
of the contract, and 𝑭𝒊
𝒋, a vector of socioeconomic characteristics that influence the farmer’s 
choice. 𝑖
𝑗 is an independently and identically distributed error term that captures 
unobservable factors that may also influence farmer’s choice. A farmer chooses alternative i, 
if 𝑉𝑖 > 𝑉𝑘, that is, utility derived from i is higher than utility derived from alternative k. The 
choice probabilities are derived with the assumption that the error term follows a logistic 





2.3.3 Contract Design Attributes 
The first step in designing a choice experiment is selecting relevant attributes and their 
corresponding levels (Hensher et al., 2005). The experiment was designed such that the 
attributes closely resembled those in the actual contracts that supermarkets issue to vegetable 
farmers in Kiambu (see previous section). The surveys in 2008 and 2012 and the related 
analyses (Rao and Qaim, 2011; Rao et al., 2012; Rao and Qaim, 2013; Andersson et al., 2015) 
were useful in designing the choice experiment that was conducted in 2015. In addition, 
several focus group discussions were carried out in Kiambu in late 2014 to understand 
farmers’ views on different contract attributes in a qualitative way. Based on this information, 
we selected five attributes used in the choice experiment, as shown in Table 2.1. 
The first contract attribute is price, expressed in Kenyan shillings (Ksh) per vegetable bundle. 
We used six price levels ranging from Ksh 10, the average price in traditional channels, to 
Ksh 20, the highest price supermarket farmers reported to have received in their contracts 
during recent years. The second attribute is the place of sale with three attribute levels (Table 
2.1). As discussed, contracted farmers have to deliver their vegetables to supermarket stores 
in Nairobi (buyer’s premise). This involves significant transportation and transaction costs 
(Andersson et al., 2015). The other two levels (farm gate and nearby market) were included to 
test how constraining these costs really are to farmers. 
The third attribute is the form of sale with two attribute levels. “Sold as harvested” without 
any post-harvest treatment is the common form in traditional channels. However, supermarket 
farmers have to wash, sort, and bundle the vegetables ready for supermarket shelves. These 
post-harvest operations can be quite labor-intensive; most of the post-harvest handling is 
carried out by female household members or female hired workers (Rao and Qaim, 2013). 
The fourth contract attribute relates to the timing of sales with three attribute levels. 
Traditional channel farmers can sell in the spot market whenever they want, while 
supermarket farmers have to deliver their vegetables according to the time schedule specified 
in the contract. The latter requires more careful planning and management of the production 
process. As explained, supermarkets have recently (especially after 2012) also started to 
procure vegetables by calling contracted farmers via phone whenever quantities are needed. 




Table 2. 1 Contract attributes and attribute levels 
Attribute Levels Description of attribute levels 
Price Price 
10 Ksh per bundlea 
12 Ksh per bundle 
14 Ksh per bundle 
16 Ksh per bundle 
18 Ksh per bundle 
20 Ksh per bundle 
Place of sale 
Place1 Farm gatea  
Place2 Nearby market 
Place3 Buyer’s premise  
Form of sale 
Form1 Sold as harvesteda 
Form2 Sold in washed and sorted form 
Timing of sale 
Timing1 Sales possible at any timea 
Timing2 Sales at times specified in the contract 
Timing3 Sales based on phone orders by buyer 
Payment mode 
Payment1 Payment immediate, based on quantity delivereda 
Payment2 Payment delayed, based on quantity delivered  
Payment3 Payment delayed, based on quantity buyer sold to customers, 
physically verifiable by farmer 
Payment4 Payment delayed, based on quantity buyer sold to customers, 
verifiable by farmer through bar coding system 
Payment5 Payment delayed, based on quantity buyer sold to customers, not 
verifiable by farmer 
aThis attribute level is common in traditional marketing channels. 
 
The fifth attribute relates to the payment mode. Whereas traditional channel farmers receive 
spot payments, in supermarket contracts payment delays are common. We further consider 
actual payments to the farmer, either for the quantity delivered, as was common in contracts 
until 2012, or for the quantity that the supermarket was able to sell to consumers, as has 
become common recently (see previous section). Finally, for the same attribute we 
differentiate between three options for the farmer to verify the quantity that the supermarket 
claims it was unable to sell. Modalities of verification are important especially when levels of 
trust between transacting partners are limited. The first option in our experiment is physical 
verification, meaning that the farmer can see and pick up the unsold quantity at the 
supermarket store. This was the existing arrangement at the time of the survey in 2015. The 
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second option is through a barcoding system, where the farmer would get a computer-
generated slip with sold and unsold quantities recorded by a barcode scanner. This second 
option is hypothetical, as such technology is not yet used by Kenyan supermarkets for 
vegetable sales. The third option is “not verifiable by the farmer” (Table 2.1). 
These attributes and corresponding levels lead to 540 possible combinations (6 x 3 x 2 x 3 x 
5). We used the software R to develop a D-optimal choice design. Fractional factorial design 
yielded a subset of the full factorial design choice alternatives while retaining the main and 
first-order interaction effects (Hensher et al., 2005). The choice design thus developed 
comprised 30 choice sets, blocked into five. Every respondent in the choice experiment was 
randomly assigned to one of the five blocks, each having six choice cards. Each choice card 
had three options, two contract options with varying attribute levels, and a no-contract option, 
representing the conditions in traditional channels. Respondents were asked to only choose 
one option in each of the six choice cards. 
Prior to starting the choice experiment, detailed explanations on the differences between 
attributes and attribute levels were provided to farmers (see explanations and instructions used 
in the general appendix). On the choice cards, pictures were used to further facilitate farmers’ 
understanding of the different options to choose from. An example of a choice card with 
English labels is shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2. 2. Example of a choice card 
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2.3.4 Estimation Procedure 
In many empirical studies with choice experimental data, multinomial or conditional logit 
models have been used for data analysis. However, in more recent studies mixed logit models 
have become more popular (Hole, 2007). Unlike multinomial or conditional logit models, 
mixed logit models do not impose the restrictive independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
assumption. The unobserved factors (captured in the error term) are therefore allowed to be 
correlated over choice alternatives. Furthermore, mixed logit models take into account 
preference heterogeneity across respondents so that it is possible to elicit multiple choice sets 
from the same respondents with unrestricted substitution patterns (Hensher et al., 2005). 
We start with a model that only includes the contract attributes as explanatory variables: 
𝑌𝑛𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑛𝐴𝑆𝐶 + 𝛽𝑃𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾′𝑛𝑨𝒏𝒋𝒕 + 𝑛𝑗𝑡 (2) 
where Y equals one if farmer n chooses choice alternative j given choice options 𝑡. 𝑃 is the 
price attribute, and 𝑨𝒏𝒋𝒕 the vector of other contract attributes, including place of sale, form of 
sale, timing of sale, and payment mode. Positive values for the estimated 𝛾 coefficients imply 
that respondents have a positive preference for the particular attribute level, and vice versa.  
is the random error term. ASC is the alternative-specific constant, which captures farmers’ 
general preferences for contracts, beyond the contract attributes specified. The base scenario 
is dummy-coded; it takes a value of one if the no-contract option was chosen, meaning that a 
positive 𝛼 coefficient implies negative general attitudes towards contracts, and vice versa. 
In further specifications, we extend this model with additional explanatory variables. In 
particular, we include different sets of interaction terms to learn more about preference 
heterogeneity among farmers. Some farmers in our sample had real supermarket contracts in 
2015, others had contracts in the past, and yet others had no own experience with supermarket 
contracts.2 To examine the role of farmers’ own contract history, we estimate the following 
model: 





𝑛(𝐴𝑆𝐶 × 𝑯𝒏 ) + 𝑛𝑗𝑡 (3) 
where H is a vector of dummy variables characterizing SM stayers, SM dropouts, and SM 
newcomers. TC stayers are used as the reference group. Positive 𝛿 coefficients mean that 
                                                          
2 We also test whether pooling of observations from supermarket and traditional channel farmers in one model is 
permissible. This is further elaborated in the results section. 
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farmers in the particular group have stronger negative attitudes towards contracts than farmers 
in the group of TC stayers, and vice versa. 
We also analyze the possible role of other socioeconomic characteristics: 






(𝐴𝑆𝐶 × 𝑺𝒏 ) + 𝑛𝑗𝑡 (4) 
where S is a vector of socioeconomic variables, including farm characteristics, farmer’s age, 
education, and gender, as well as household income and region dummies. 
Socioeconomic factors may not only influence farmers’ general contract preferences but also 
their attitude towards particular contract attributes. This is analyzed with the following model: 





𝑛(𝑨𝒏𝒋𝒕 × 𝑺𝒏 ) + 𝑛𝑗𝑡 (5) 
Positive 𝜏 coefficients mean that farmers with higher levels of S have more positive (or less 
negative) attitudes towards a particular contract attribute level, and vice versa. 
Using dummy coding, all models are estimated in preference space, which leads to a better fit 
in mixed logit models than when estimating in willingness to pay space (Hole and Kolstad, 
2012). For the price attribute, we assume a fixed coefficient, while for all other contract 
attributes we assume preference heterogeneity across respondents with normal distribution. 
This is a common approach in the choice experimental literature (Hensher et al., 2005). 
Following Hole (2007), simulated maximum likelihood method was used to estimate the 
parameters. The estimates were run in Stata version 13. 
By rearranging equation (2), we determine price (P) as follows: 
𝑃𝑛𝑗𝑡 = [𝑌𝑛𝑗𝑡 − 𝛼𝑛𝐴𝑆𝐶 − 𝛾
′
𝑛
𝑨𝒏𝒋𝒕 − 𝑛𝑗𝑡]/𝛽  (6) 
Willingness to accept (WTA) estimates for each attribute level are obtained from partial 
derivatives of P with respect to A as follows: 




⁄ . (7) 
Positive WTA estimates imply that farmers would only accept a particular contract attribute 
level when being offered a higher price. Like the price attribute, WTA is expressed in Ksh. 
Comparing WTA estimates between the different attributes and attribute levels can help 
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identify contract terms that are seen by farmers as particularly critical. All the mixed logit 
models estimated are uncorrelated, meaning that we assumed independent and normally 
distributed coefficient estimates. Likelihood ratio tests for independent groups show that 
uncorrelated models are preferred over correlated ones. 
 
2.4 Results and Discussion 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics of selected socioeconomic variables for the sample of 
farm households in Kiambu. Most farms are very small, averaging 1.8 acres, with a vegetable 
area of about 0.5 acres. Farmers in the sample grow leafy vegetables primarily for sale. In 
addition, they typically grow maize, bananas, and a few other cash crops. Many are also 
involved in off-farm economic activities. Vegetable production is the main source of income 
for most sample households. The majority of the farmers (86%) are members of a farmer 
group, although many of the groups are not very active.3 Only 8% of the farmers market their 
vegetables in a coordinated way through the groups. 
Sample mean values of many of the key variables – such as farm size and vegetable area – are 
similar to those reported in other studies on farmers in Central Kenya producing vegetables 
for the domestic market (Neven et al., 2009). Production for the export market is hardly 
observed in Kiambu County. Vegetable farms involved in export markets in other Kenyan 
counties are somewhat larger, with mean farm sizes of 3-4 acres (Asfaw et al., 2010; Muriithi 
and Matz, 2015). 
A breakdown of our sample from Kiambu by supermarket (SM) and traditional channel (TC) 
farmers is shown in Table A2.1 of appendix to chapter 2. We find significant differences 
between the two groups for many of the variables. SM farmers have better educational levels, 
better access to credit, and higher incomes than TC farmers. In Table A2.2 of appendix to 
chapter 2, we compare key variables for the two groups of farmers over the three survey 
rounds. In Table A2.3 of appendix to chapter 2, we show descriptive statistics for 2015, 
differentiating by farmers with different contracting history. 
                                                          
3 Farmer groups in Kenya are often established with a particular project in mind. Some groups remain active also 
after the project ended. Other groups continue to exist on paper, yet without much activity. Sometimes, passive 
groups can be revived when a new project is initiated. 
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Table 2. 2 Summary statistics of selected socioeconomic variables (2015)  
Variable Description of variable Mean SE 
Farm size Land owned by household (acres) 1.81 0.14 
Farm income Annual farm income (000 Ksh) 418.63 46.42 
Off-farm income Households has off-farm income sources (dummy) 0.78 0.02 
Total income Annual household income (000 Ksh) 556.57 50.36 
Irrigation Access to advanced irrigation technology (dummy) 0.72 0.02 
Vegetable area Land cultivated with vegetables in 2015 (acres) 0.54 0.04 
Vegetable share Contribution of vegetable income to total farm income (%) 0.84 0.01 
Group member Membership in farmer group (dummy) 0.86 0.02 
Group marketing Vegetables are marketed through farmer group (dummy) 0.08 0.01 
Distance Distance to the nearest supermarket (km) 9.79 0.43 
Credit access Household has access to credit (dummy) 0.72 0.02 
Livestock Ownership of livestock (dummy) 0.84 0.02 
Male Male household head (dummy) 0.86 0.02 
Age Age of household head (years) 54.31 0.70 
Education Years of schooling of household head (years) 9.67 0.18 
Notes: Observations = 409; SE, standard error; 1 US dollar = 103 Kenya shillings (Ksh). 
 
 
2.4.2  Farmers’ Preferences for Contracts and Contract Attributes 
We start by testing the appropriateness of model specifications. Estimation results of the first 
set of mixed logit models are shown in Table 2.3. In the first column, the total sample of SM 
and TC farmers is pooled. We tested for the IIA assumption using a Hausman test. The null 
hypothesis that the IIA assumption holds had to be rejected (p<0.05), implying that the mixed 
logit model is preferred over multinomial or conditional logit models. The superiority of the 
mixed logit is also underlined by the significant standard deviation estimates, which are 
shown in the lower part of Table 2.3. The significance of these estimates confirms that 
heterogeneity in farmers’ preferences for the different contract attributes exists. 
Given the observed differences between SM and TC farmers in Table A2.1 of appendix to 
chapter 2, we also tested whether pooling of the two groups in one model is actually 
appropriate. For this, we estimated separate models for the two subsamples, which are shown 
in the second and third columns of Table 2.3. Differences in coefficient estimates between the 
two separate models are tested in the last Table column. Most of the differences are indeed 
statistically significant, so that relying on the pooled model alone could possibly lead to 
misinterpretation. In the subsequent analysis, we use the separate models to highlight 
differences in preferences between SM and TC farmers. Only for some more general 
statements on preference directions we use the pooled model results, which are more efficient 
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due to the larger number of observations included. This is permissible because the coefficient 
signs are the same across all three models shown in Table 2.3. 
Table 2. 3 Mixed logit model estimates of farmers’ general preferences for contracts 
 Pooled sample SM farmers TC farmers H0: βSM=βTC 
Parameters     
ASC 0.95*** (0.27) 0.85* (0.50) 0.76**(0.36) p > 0.05 
Price 0.34***(0.03) 0.29*** (0.10) 0.34*** (0.04) p < 0.01 
Sales at a nearby market (place2) -1.21*** (0.26) -0.50 (0.50) -1.12*** (0.29) p < 0.01 
Sales at buyers’ premises (place3) -0.86*** (0.24) -0.10 (0.75) -1.11*** (0.32) p < 0.01 
Sold in washed and sorted form (form2) -0.33** (0.16) -0.50 (0.42) -0.36 (0.23) p < 0.01 
Sales as scheduled in contract (timing2) -0.25 (0.21) 0.17 (0.49) -0.33 (0.24) p < 0.01 
Sales based on phone orders (timing3) -0.88*** (0.29) -0.43 (0.43) -1.11** (0.44) p < 0.01 
Payment delayed, for quantity delivered 
(payment2) -1.86
*** (0.29) -0.31 (0.53) -2.30*** (0.35) p < 0.01 
Payment delayed, for quantity sold to 
customers, physically verifiable (payment3) -4.58
*** (0.49) -3.66* (2.00) -5.01*** (0.92) p < 0.01 
Payment delayed, for quantity sold to 
customers, verifiable through bar coding 
(payment4) 
-5.85*** (0.63) -4.56 (3.13) -6.41*** (1.31) p < 0.01 
Payment delayed, for quantity  sold to 
customers, not verifiable (payment5) -7.79
*** (1.07) -6.91 (6.05) -8.03*** (1.54) p < 0.01 
Standard deviations     
ASC 2.22*** (0.20) 1.54***(0.51) 2.27*** (0.30) p < 0.01 
Place2 1.22*** (0.25) 0.74 (1.20) -0.03 (1.10) p < 0.01 
Place3 3.44*** (0.28) 1.41 (1.43) 1.29*** (0.46) p > 0.05 
Form2 -0.02 (0.28) 0.10 (0.42) -0.54 (0.36) p < 0.01 
Timing2 -0.98** (0.44) -1.63 (1.40) -0.77 (0.70) p < 0.01 
Timing3 1.89*** (0.34) 0.49 (0.74) 2.47*** (0.55) p < 0.01 
Payment2 2.14*** (0.29) -0.72 (0.68) 2.38*** (0.40) p < 0.01 
Payment3 1.43*** (0.46) 2.50 (1.55) 1.38 (1.07) p < 0.01 
Payment4 2.41*** (0.51) 3.09 (2.58) 2.47* (1.33) p < 0.05 
Payment5 3.38*** (0.77) -5.10 (5.71) 3.18*** (0.92) p < 0.01 
N (Number of farmers) 409 72 337  
N (Number of observations) 7362 1296 6066  
Log likelihood at start -1600.58 -351.71 -1207.04  
Log likelihood at convergence -1393.21 -321.04 -1043.81  
Wald chi2  181.56*** 42.43*** 134.60***  
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.21 0.31  
Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown with standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual). The binary dependent 
variable is marketing channel (contract) choice. For place of sale, the reference is “farm gate” (place1). For form of sale, the 
reference is “sold as harvested” (form1). For time of sale, the reference is “at any time” (timing1). For payment mode, the 
reference is “payment immediate, based on quantity delivered” (payment1). ASC, alternative specific constant (refers to 
traditional channel without contract); SM, supermarket; TC, traditional channel. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
Taking a closer look at the estimates in Table 2.3, the ASC coefficient is positive and 
significant in all three models, implying that farmers prefer selling in the traditional spot 
market over selling under contract, if all other conditions are held equal. Concerning the 
contract attributes, the positive estimate for price indicates that, ceteris paribus, farmers prefer 
contracts when they offer higher prices, which is to be expected. For all other contract 
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attributes, we observe negative coefficients (most of which are significant in the pooled 
model), meaning that farmers do not like these contractual terms and conditions and are only 
willing to accept them when being compensated through higher prices. This is also expected. 
Having to deliver to a nearby market (place2) or to the supermarket in Nairobi (place3) is 
associated with higher transport and transaction costs than selling at the farm gate. Washing 
and sorting the vegetables (form2) requires more work than selling as harvested. Selling on 
short notice when called by supermarket procurement officers (timing3) makes planning and 
crop management more complex. Delayed payments (payment2) and unpredictable rates of 
product rejection increase farmers’ economic risks. The magnitude of the coefficients and 
related WTA estimates will be discussed in more detail below. However, a quick comparison 
of the estimated coefficients already suggests that the payment mode attribute is seen as 
particularly critical by farmers, and especially by TC suppliers. 
In Table 2.4 (columns 1-3), we test for the influence of farmers’ contracting history in shaping 
their preferences (equation 3). Results for the pooled model (column 1) suggest that SM 
stayers have a more positive attitude towards contracts than the other groups of farmers. This 
is plausible, given that SM stayers started to produce under contract early on and also 
remained in that channel. Among the SM farmers (column 2), newcomers to this channel have 
a more positive attitude towards contracts than SM stayers. This also makes sense, given that 
SM newcomers recently decided to enter into a contractual relationship. 
 
2.4.3 The Role of Socioeconomic Characteristics 
In columns (4) to (6) of Table 2.4, we test for the influence of various socioeconomic 
characteristics (equation 4). In all three models, the interaction of ASC and Westlands is 
negative and statistically significant, meaning that farmers in Westlands have a more positive 
general attitude towards contracts than farmers from the Lari/Limuru region, which is the 
reference. In contrast, the interaction of ASC and Githunguri is positive and significant in two 
of the models, implying that farmers from Githunguri have a less positive general attitude 
towards contracts.4 Out of the regions surveyed, Githunguri is the one furthest away from 
Nairobi and has relatively poor road infrastructure. Farmers in that region therefore have a 
locational disadvantage for contracts with supermarkets in Nairobi. As is known from the 
                                                          
4 There are too few SM farmer observations in Githunguri, so that this variable dropped out of the SM model in 
column (5) of Table 2.4. 
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literature, remoteness does not only reduce farmers’ market access in general but can also 
obstruct their participation in higher-value supply chains (Moustier et al., 2010). 
The interaction of ASC and group marketing is negative and significant for SM farmers 
(column 5), indicating that farmers who market their vegetables through a farmer group have 
a more positive preference for contracts than farmers who market individually. This is 
plausible, given that collective marketing can reduce transport and transaction costs 
(Andersson et al., 2015). Furthermore, active farmer groups are important platforms for 
learning and information exchange, which can be particularly relevant in meeting standards of 
product quality and consistency. The interaction of ASC and age of household head is 
negative and significant as well, meaning that older SM farmers have more positive general 
attitudes towards contracts than younger ones. This may possibly be related to higher levels of 
experience, which can help to better cope with new requirements in emerging supply chains. 
24 
  













Parameters       
ASC 1.24***(0.30) 0.40 (0.56) 0.84*** (0.31) 1.86**(0.93) 7.46*** (2.02) 0.85 (1.23) 
Price 0.32*** (0.03) 0.24*** (0.04) 0.34*** (0.04) 0.33*** (0.03) 0.26*** (0.05) 0.34*** (0.05) 
Sales at a nearby market (place2) -1.10*** (0.25) -0.42 (0.39) -1.22*** (0.40) -1.16*** (0.24) -0.43*** (0.42) -1.16*** (0.31) 
Sales at buyers’ premises (place3) -0.75*** (0.24) -0.11*** (0.39) -1.12*** (0.32) -0.82*** (0.24) 0.09 (0.36) -1.24*** (0.40) 
Sold in washed and sorted form (form2) -0.27* (0.16) -0.34 (0.24) -0.36* (0.20) -0.30* (0.16) -0.41* (0.24) -0.40 (0.28) 
Sales as scheduled in contract (timing2) -0.23 (0.20) -0.38 (0.36) -0.33 (0.25) -0.26 (0.21) 0.33 (0.36) -0.35 (0.27) 
Sales based on phone orders (timing3) -0.84*** (0.27) -0.44 (0.41) -1.01*** (0.33) -0.92*** (0.26) 0.50 (0.40) -1.18*** (0.39) 
Payment delayed, for quantity delivered (payment2) -1.74*** (0.28) -0.01 (0.36) -2.22*** (0.31) -1.79*** (0.28) -0.08 (0.36) -2.36*** (0.40) 
Payment delayed, for quantity sold to customers, 
physically verifiable (payment3) 
-4.23*** (0.47) -2.70*** (0.69) -5.03*** (0.91) -4.48*** (0.54) -3.06*** (1.20) -5.16*** (1.22) 
Payment delayed, for quantity sold to customers, 
verifiable through bar coding (payment4) 
-5.49*** (0.63) -2.68*** (1.00) -6.81*** (1.22) -5.73*** (0.62) -3.47*** (0.97) -6.86** (2.75) 
Payment delayed, for quantity  sold to customers, not 
verifiable (payment5) 
-7.23*** (1.17) -3.71*** (1.23) -7.85*** (1.48) -7.58*** (1.13) -3.92*** (0.94) -8.29*** (1.54) 
Interactions       
ASC x SM stayers (dummy) -2.06** (0.86)      
ASC x SM dropouts (dummy)  -0.43 (0.40)  -0.50 (0.45)    
ASC x SM newcomers (dummy) -0.68 (0.44) -1.12** (0.45)     
ASC x Githunguri region (dummy)  1.35**(0.53)  1.12* (0.61) 
ASC x Westlands region (dummy)  -1.62** (0.77) -2.17** (0.98) -1.89* (1.00) 
ASC x Kikuyu region (dummy)  0.10 (0.29) -1.38* (0.76) 0.21 (0.38) 
ASC x Group marketing (dummy)  -1.31**(0.53) -1.84** (0.75) -0.84 (0.77) 
ASC x Age (years)    -0.002 (0.02) -0.05** (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 
ASC x Education (years)   -0.02 (0.04) -0.11 (0.10) 0.001 (0.00) 
ASC x Male (dummy)   -0.57 (0.39) -0.99 (0.77) -0.51 (0.47) 
ASC x Annual income (000 Ksh)   -0.00020* (0.00011) -2.07e-4 (0.00) -0.001(0.00) 
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Table 2.4. (continued)           
Standard deviations      
ASC 2.05*** (0.21) 1.49*** (0.36) 0.84*** (0.31) 2.07*** (0.21) 1.35*** (0.30) 2.22*** (0.37) 
Place2 1.05*** (0.30) 0.77 (0.62) -1.22*** (0.40) 1.09*** (0.26) -0.77 (0.48) 0.05 (0.99) 
Place3 1.21*** (0.33) 0.50 (1.24) -1.29** (0.57) 1.33*** (0.28) 0.79 (0.69) 1.53*** (0.46) 
Form2 -0.15 (0.34) 0.04 (0.40) -0.32 (0.29) -0.12 (0.27) -0.40 (0.40) -0.51 (0.45) 
Timing2 -0.93** (0.68) 0.88* (0.49) 0.62* (0.36) -1.06*** (0.52) -0.85 (0.57) -0.73 (0.62) 
Timing3 1.73*** (0.50) -0.31 (0.69) 2.28*** (1.42) 1.92*** (0.35) 0.32 (0.53) 2.61*** (0.54) 
Payment2 2.00*** (0.32) 0.13 (0.67) 2.42*** (0.39) 1.97*** (0.32) 0.35 (0.41) 2.36*** (0.43) 
Payment3 1.10* (0.58) 1.66** (0.80) 1.42 (1.06) 1.31** (0.56) 2.07** (0.97) 1.47 (1.51) 
Payment4 2.15*** (0.50) 1.21 (1.68) 2.86** (1.11) 2.31*** (0.46) -2.44*** (0.86) 2.89 (2.60) 
Payment5 3.01*** (0.86) 1.88 (1.26) 3.05*** (0.86) 3.21*** (0.80) 1.88** (0.76) 3.30*** (1.00) 
Number of observations 7362 1296 6066 7362 1296 6066 
Log likelihood at start -1568.68 -343.99 -1206.20 -1563.49 -338.78 -1192.51 
Log likelihood at convergence -1386.34 -320.32 -1043.29 -1380.19 -313.33 -1036.95 
Wald chi2  233.08*** 106.16*** 170.22*** 202.39*** 98.91*** 116.47*** 
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.21 0.31 0.27 0.20 0.30 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown with standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual). The binary dependent variable is marketing channel (contract) choice. For place of sale, the 
reference is “farm gate” (place1). For form of sale, the reference is “sold as harvested” (form1). For time of sale, the reference is “at any time” (timing1). For payment mode, the reference is 
“payment immediate, based on quantity delivered” (payment1). For the regional dummies, the reference is Lari/Limuru region. ASC, alternative specific constant (refers to traditional channel 
without contract); SM, supermarket; TC, traditional channel. * significant at 10% level; *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Besides influencing general contract preferences, socioeconomic characteristics can also 
influence attitudes towards the different contract attributes. This is tested by interacting 
contract attributes with socioeconomic variables (equation 5). The main results of these 
models are shown in Table 2.5 (full results are shown in Tables A2.5 and A2.6 of appendix to 
chapter 2. These estimates are based on separate models for SM farmers (upper part of Table 
2.5) and TC farmers (lower part of Table 2.5). In column (1), the contract attributes were 
interacted with the age of the household head. Each interaction term has to be considered 
together with the coefficient of the corresponding contract attribute itself. For instance, for TC 
farmers the coefficient for the interaction of age and place2 is negative and significant, 
meaning that older TC farmers have more negative attitudes towards delivering their 
vegetables to a nearby marketplace than younger farmers. Probably, older farmers are less 
mobile.  
At the same time, the coefficient for place2 itself, which is negative and significant in the 
models in Table 2.3, is now insignificant. This implies that younger farmers have no problem 
with delivering their vegetables to a nearby marketplace (compared to selling at the farm 
gate). Nearby markets are usually located in the next town, to which younger farmers travel 
more frequently than older farmers anyway. 
In column (2) of Table 2.5, the contract attributes are interacted with education. Better 
educated TC farmers have more positive attitudes towards having to deliver their vegetables 
to a nearby market than less educated TC farmers. The results also indicate that better 
educated TC farmers have fewer problems with adjusting to fixed time schedules for 
vegetable supplies (timing2). Column (3) looks at the role of household income. Richer 
farmers have a less negative attitude towards delayed payments (payment2), which is true for 
both TC and SM farmers. This is plausible given that richer farmers tend to be less affected 
by liquidity constraints than poorer ones. Most other interaction effects in this model are 
insignificant, meaning that income does not affect farmers’ preferences for these other 
contract attributes. 
In column (4) of Table 2.5, the only significant interaction terms are those between the 
Kikuyu region and some of the payment mode attributes. Farmers in Kikuyu have a more 
negative attitude towards payment based on quantities the supermarket states it was able to 
sell, especially when these statements cannot be physically verified. 
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Table 2. 5 Mixed logit models with interactions between contract attributes and socioeconomic characteristics 
  Variables interacted with attribute levels 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age (years) Education (years) Income (000 Ksh) Kikuyu (dummy) Group marketing (dummy) 
Interacted with…          SM farmers 
…Payment2 -0.02 (0.02) 0.10 (0.14) 0.0003* (0.0001) -0.53 (0.58) 0.04 (0.74) 
…Payment4 0.04 (0.05) -0.40 (0.35) 0.0002 (0.0003) -1.73* (0.90) 1.70 (1.59) 
…Payment5 0.01 (0.05) 0.11 (0.36) 0.0001 (0.0004) -2.13* (1.14) 3.01 (2.36) 
Parameters 
     ASC 0.96* (0.50) 1.17** (0.57) 1.01** (0.51) 1.10** (0.52) 0.94* (0.51) 
Payment2 0.79 (1.31) -1.30 (1.70) -0.45 (0.43) 0.18 (0.47) -0.13 (0.46) 
Payment4 -4.92 (3.86) -0.21 (2.43) -3.31*** (0.79) -2.24** (0.90) -4.04* (2.35) 
Payment5 -4.65 (3.58) -3.94 (6.87) -4.50 (3.07) -2.82*** (1.01) -4.76 (3.66) 
Interacted with…          TC farmers 
…Place2 -0.04** (0.02) 0.15** (0.06) 2.99e-05 (0.0004) 0.54 (0.44) -2.01 (1.46) 
…Timing2 -0.01 (0.01) 0.09** (0.05) -0.001** (0.0003) -0.27 (0.38) 1.48* (0.87) 
…Payment2 0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.07) 0.0007* (0.0004) -0.52 (0.52) 0.71 (1.29) 
…Payment4 0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.12) -0.002** (0.0009) -0.83 (1.11) 1.59 (1.59) 
…Payment5 0.03 (0.04) 0.17 (0.17) -0.001 (0.001) -4.89*** (0.99) -0.13 (2.64) 
Parameters 
     ASC 0.85** (0.35) 0.75** (0.32) 0.80** (0.32) 0.82*** (0.31) 0.79** (0.32) 
Place2 0.50 (0.82) -2.64*** (0.74) -1.31*** (0.48) -1.49*** (0.38) -1.39*** (0.31) 
Timing2 0.20 (0.80) -1.27** (0.51) -0.70** (0.28) -0.20 (0.27) -0.39 (0.26) 
Payment2 -2.74** (1.23) -2.65*** (0.82) -2.70*** (0.40) -2.07*** (0.38) -2.46*** (0.39) 
Payment4 -8.18*** (1.96) -6.77*** (1.34) -6.23*** (1.16) -6.76*** (0.95) -6.51*** (0.78) 
Payment5 -10.16*** (2.48) -9.77*** (2.64) -8.75*** (1.57) -6.47*** (0.89) -9.86*** (1.30) 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown with standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual). The binary dependent variable is marketing channel (contract) choice. Only selected variables are 
shown. Full model results can be found in Tables A2.5 and A2.6 of appendix to chapter 2. Place2, nearby market; Timing2, sales at times specified in the contract; Payment2, payment delayed, for 
quantity delivered. Payment4, payment delayed, for quantity sold to customers, verifiable through bar coding; Payment5, payment delayed, for quantity sold to customers, not verifiable. For place of 
sale, the reference is “farm gate” (place1).  For time of sale, the reference is “at any time” (timing1). For payment mode, the reference is “payment immediate, based on quantity delivered” (payment1). 
ASC, alternative specific constant (refers to traditional channel without contract); SM, supermarket; TC, traditional channel; *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Column (5) shows interactions between group marketing and contract attributes. TC farmers that 
market their vegetables through a group are more positive about fixed delivery schedules (timing2) 
than their colleagues who market individually. Group marketing requires timely coordination anyway, 
with and without supermarket contracts.  
 
2.4.4 Farmers’ Willingness to Accept 
The model estimates so far have shown that farmers have varied attitudes towards contracting in 
general, dislike some of the typical attributes in supermarket contracts, and are only willing to contract 
when the disadvantages are compensated through higher product prices. Now we want to analyze 
farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) these contract attributes more explicitly. Mean WTA estimates 
for each contract attribute level are shown in Table 2.6, for the pooled sample as well as separately for 
SM and TC farmers. 
Table 2. 6 Mean willingness to accept (WTA) different contract attribute levels 
Attribute level Pooled sample SM farmers TC farmers 
Sales at a nearby market (place2) 3.04 1.80*** 3.31 
 [2.98,3.11] [1.59,2.01] [3.31,3.31] 
Sales at buyers’ premise (place3) 2.76 0.22*** 3.30 
 [2.55,2.97] [-0.40,0.84] [3.14,3.46] 
Sold in washed and sorted form (form2) 1.16 1.74 1.05 
 [1.13,1.21] [1.72,1.75] [1.01,1.09] 
Sales as scheduled in contract (timing2) 0.68 -0.69*** 0.97 
 [0.52,0.83] [-1.44,0.06]  [0.91,1.03] 
Sales based on phone orders (timing3) 3.07 1.52*** 3.40 
 [2.71,3.41] [1.41,1.62] [2.98,3.82] 
Payment delayed, for quantity delivered (payment2) 5.83 1.03*** 6.86 
[5.42,6.23] [0.84,1.22] [6.44,7.27] 
Payment delayed, for quantity buyer sold to 
customers, physically verifiable (payment3) 
14.48 12.41*** 14.93 
[14.22,14.75] [11.13,13.70] [14.80,15.05] 
Payment delayed, for quantity buyer sold to 
customers, verifiable through bar coding (payment4) 
18.51 15.76*** 19.10 
[18.13,18.89] [14.25,17.28] [18.81,19.38] 
Payment delayed, for quantity buyer sold to 
customers, not verifiable (payment5) 
23.96 24.44 23.85 
[23.43,24.48] [22.03,26.85] [23.48,24.23] 
N (Number of observations) 409 72 337 
Notes: Values are expressed in Ksh per bundle of vegetables. Confidence intervals (95%) are shown in brackets; these were 
derived with the delta method. SM, supermarket; TC, traditional channel. *, **, *** Differences in the mean WTA estimates 






The WTA values are expressed in Ksh per bundle of vegetables and can be interpreted as the 
average price premium farmers require in order to accept a particular attribute. The average 
price of vegetables in traditional marketing channels was Ksh 10 per bundle. Against this 
background the estimates in Table 2.6 appear quite high. It should be mentioned that the exact 
WTA values should not be over-interpreted, and their magnitude might have to be discounted 
somewhat, given the well-known hypothetical bias that stated preferences data often suffer 
from (Hensher et al., 2005). Moreover, mixed logit models tend to result in higher WTA 
values when estimated in preference space, as done here, than when estimated in willingness 
to pay space (Hole and Kolstad, 2012). However, there is no reason to believe that these 
issues affect some attributes more than others, so an unbiased relative ranking between the 
different attributes is possible. 
Looking at the results for the pooled sample in Table 2.6, farmers require a price premium of 
Ksh 3.0 (30%) to accept a contract with delivery to a nearby market. This WTA is relatively 
large and underlines that transportation and transaction costs – including opportunity costs of 
the farmer’s time – are sizeable. The quantities typically delivered per transaction are small. 
Many of the farmers do not own a motor vehicle; they have to use public transportation or 
organize transport in other ways. The required premium for delivering to the supermarket 
stores in Nairobi is also high (Ksh 2.8). Interestingly, however, the WTA values for delivering 
to a nearby market and to Nairobi are very similar. Establishing more decentralized collection 
centers therefore might not substantially increase the rates of farmers’ participation in 
contracts.  
Having to sell in washed and sorted form requires an average price premium of 12% to 
compensate for the additional costs of post-harvest handling. For the condition to deliver their 
vegetables at specified dates, farmers demand a price increase of about 7%. The WTA more 
ad-hoc orders through phone calls is higher (31%), but still within the range of price 
premiums typically paid by supermarkets. Hence, these conditions related to post-harvest 
handling and timing of sales do not seem to be major hurdles for farmers to engage in 
supermarket contracts. 
All payment mode attribute levels are associated with high WTA estimates, suggesting that 
these are the most critical features in the supermarket contracts from the farmers’ perspective. 
For delayed payments, farmers require an average price premium of 58%. This can be 
explained by liquidity constraints. Farmers need the cash to pay for household needs, 
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outstanding bills, and farm inputs required to ensure high-quality production. Delayed 
payments also increase the subjectively felt risk of contract partners defaulting. The WTA 
gets much higher when payments are not based on what farmers delivered but on what the 
supermarket was able to sell to its customers. To some extent, this depends on the quality 
delivered. Yet there are also other factors that determine supermarket sales beyond the 
farmers’ control. Hence, the marketing risk increases substantially. 
When payment is based on the quantity the supermarket sold to its customers, verifiable 
through later inspection of the unsold quantity, farmers’ mean WTA is a price premium of 
Ksh 14.5 per bundle (145%). This attribute level (payment3) is the one that was actually 
observed in supermarket contracts in 2015. However, this WTA is much higher than 
contractual price premiums typically observed. This recent change in contractual design may 
therefore explain – at least partly – why some farmers dropped out of their contracts and why 
overall participation rates remain relatively low.5 
For the other two attribute levels related to payment mode (payment4 and payment5), WTA 
estimates are still much higher (Table 2.6), which is likely due to issues of distrust. 
Verification through a barcoding system (payment4) could be a technical way of reducing the 
chances of opportunistic behavior, while also lowering transaction costs (in comparison to 
physical inspection). However, the WTA estimates suggest that farmers do not have full 
confidence in this technological alternative. When farmers are unable to verify the quantity 
supermarkets sold to customers (payment5), there may be concerns that the supermarkets 
cheat by underreporting actual sales.   
A comparison of WTA estimates across the different attributes also sheds some light on 
farmers’ risk perceptions. Shifting from a fixed time schedule of product delivery (timing2) to 
sales based on phone orders (timing3) introduces delivery risk. The required price premium 
for this delivery risk is relatively small, only about Ksh 2.4 per bundle of vegetables. The 
reason is probably that farmers expect phone orders to come at a certain frequency; otherwise 
there would be no reason for supermarkets to offer a contract. Switching from payment for the 
quantity delivered (payment2) to payment for the quantity sold (payment3) introduces 
demand risk with a higher price premium required, namely Ksh 8.7 per bundle. On the one 
                                                          
5 We estimated additional models where we interacted the payment mode attribute levels with dummy variables 
for SM stayers and SM dropouts, both for the pooled sample and the two subsamples (Table A2.4 of Appendix 
to chapter 2). The small group of SM stayers has significantly less negative attitudes than the SM dropouts (and 
TC stayers) towards payments based on what supermarkets were able to sell. 
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hand, there is no transparent quality grading system that could help farmers to assess possible 
rejection rates ex ante. On the other hand, unsold quantities in supermarket stores also depend 
on the efficiency of store management, which farmers are unable to influence. Switching from 
verified sales (payment3) to unverified sales (payment5) additionally introduces counterparty 
risk, for which a price premium of Ksh 9.5 per bundle is required. This high premium reflects 
the general distrust that many farmers have in supermarkets. This was also confirmed in focus 
group discussions. Studies in other settings also showed that farmers often distrust buyers that 
they do not know personally (Schipmann and Qaim, 2011). 
The WTA estimates from the separate SM and TC models show significant differences 
between the two groups (Table 2.6). As one could expect, SM farmers have significantly 
lower WTA values for most of the attributes. This comparison suggests that modifications in 
contract design in terms of these attributes could affect farmers’ participation rates positively. 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
We have carried out a choice experiment with vegetable farmers in Kenya to analyze how 
changes in contractual design may help to increase smallholder participation in supermarket 
contracting. The hypothetical contracts used in the choice experiment closely resembled those 
that Kenyan supermarkets actually apply to procure fresh vegetables from farmers. In these 
existing contract schemes, smallholder participation rates are relatively low and dropout rates 
are high. 
The choice experimental data and mixed logit models were used to show that farmers have 
varied preferences for contracts. Most farmers seem to have rather negative attitudes towards 
contracting in general. Some of the contract design attributes make participation especially 
difficult. The contracts require farmers to deliver their vegetables to supermarket stores in 
Nairobi, which is associated with high transport and transaction costs, especially for farmers 
in more remote regions with poor infrastructure. Supermarkets also require farmers to wash, 
sort, and bundle the vegetables ready for supermarket shelves. These post-harvest operations 
are also associated with higher costs. Willingness to accept (WTA) estimates reveal that 
farmers require price premiums of 10-30% to compensate for the higher costs associated with 
these contract attributes. Nevertheless, these contract attributes related to the place and form 
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of vegetable sales do not seem to be the main hurdles for more widespread smallholder 
participation. 
The most critical contract attributes are related to payment mode. Farmers dislike delayed 
payments that are commonplace in contract schemes. Delayed payments can aggravate 
liquidity constraints and also increase the possible risk of defaulting. Current supermarket 
farmers have a mean WTA for delayed payments of 10%, whereas TC farmers would require 
a price premium of close to 70% to accept this attribute. This is higher than typical price 
premiums paid in contract schemes, suggesting that delayed payments contribute to low 
participation rates by smallholders. 
Also related to payment mode, supermarkets have recently changed the basis on which 
payments are made. Rather than paying for the quantity of vegetables delivered, farmers are 
now paid only for the quantity that the supermarket was able to sell to its customers. This 
change has further increased farmers’ marketing risk. The choice experimental data suggest 
that farmers’ mean WTA for this payment clause is around 145%, again with higher values 
for TC than SM farmers. This recent change in payment mode seems to be an important factor 
in explaining the high farmer dropout rates observed. The analysis also revealed that distrust 
may be an issue. Farmers do not seem to believe supermarket statements about unsold 
quantities without the option to physically verify. 
These results confirm that contractual design matters. They also suggest that better tailoring 
contracts to the conditions of smallholders can help to increase participation rates. Reducing 
payment delays, introducing standardized and verifiable quality grading systems, higher 
levels of transparency, and a fairer distribution of risk are all avenues that could make 
contracts more viable for smallholders. The analysis also showed that farmers marketing in 
groups have more positive attitudes towards contracts. Collective action in groups helps to 
reduce transportation and transaction costs and – through joint learning and peer pressure – 
also can raise the quality and consistency of product supply. Hence, contracting farmer groups 
could possibly be a promising option. 
Modifying contracts in the proposed directions could be useful to involve more smallholders. 
A relevant question is whether supermarkets themselves could also benefit from making 
contracts more smallholder-friendly. This will depend on the particular situation. 
Supermarkets in Nairobi currently seem to have sufficient supplies of leafy vegetables, so that 
increasing the supplier base may not be the top priority in the short run. However, when 
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supermarkets continue to expand from the big cities to smaller towns and rural areas, and 
when fresh horticultural products shall gradually also be offered in these newly established 
stores outside of the big cities, then more procurement from smallholders may possibly 
become inevitable. Given observed supermarket growth rates in Africa, we argue that it is in 
the supermarkets’ own interest to adjust contracts more flexibly to smallholder conditions. 
Our results may also be useful for supermarket contracts in other developing countries. While 
the specific conditions differ to some extent, supermarkets in other countries of Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America also try to contract smallholders in order to source fresh products for sale 
to the growing urban middle classes (Berdegué et al,, 2005; Hernandez et al., 2007; Minten et 
al., 2009; Blandon et al., 2009b; Miyata et al., 2009; Michelson, 2013; Reardon and Timmer, 
2014). Some of the results may also be relevant for contracting in the export industry, where 
marketing issues related to product quality, timing of supply, and payment mode also occur 
(Asfaw et al., 2010; Rosch and Ortega, 2014). However, due to higher quality standards in the 
export industry there are also other issues that we did not analyze here. For instance, export 
companies often provide inputs and technologies to contracted farmers, so problems of side-
selling are much more relevant. More research is needed on how to improve the design of 














Appendix to Chapter 2 
Table A2. 1 Summary statistics by marketing channel (2015) 
 SM farmers  TC farmers   
















































































No. of observations 72 
  
337 
   Notes: SM, supermarket; TC, traditional channel; SD, standard deviation for each sample. The last column shows p-values of 
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Table A2. 3 Summary statistics for farmers with different contracting history (2015) 
  TC stayers SM stayers SM dropouts SM newcomers 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Farm size 1.57 2.66 2.37 3.56 2.41 2.54 2.14 3.99 
Household size 4.05 1.67 4.94 2.12 4.23 1.74 4.21 1.68 
Farm income 304.11 447.36 1323.35 2638.78 448.44 764.68 412.09 521.07 
Off-farm income 0.75 0.43 0.85 0.36 0.86 0.35 0.82 0.39 
Total income 413.44 485.47 1718.08 2848.18 568.58 645.22 558.00 637.28 
Irrigation 0.69 0.46 0.88 0.33 0.64 0.48 0.84 0.37 
Vegetable area 0.43 0.51 1.43 2.06 0.55 0.59 0.57 0.40 
Vegetable share 0.53 0.32 0.68 0.31 0.43 0.32 0.59 0.29 
Group member 0.88 0.33 0.85 0.36 0.80 0.40 0.84 0.37 
Group marketing 0.03 0.18 0.27 0.45 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37 
Distance 9.93 8.71 8.09 6.40 10.21 7.90 9.63 10.51 
Credit access 0.67 0.47 0.97 0.17 0.77 0.43 0.84 0.37 
Male 0.83 0.37 1.00 0.00 0.89 0.31 0.87 0.34 
Age 54.28 14.51 51.74 12.08 58.64 13.89 50.87 12.32 
Education 9.16 3.77 11.06 3.62 10.44 3.05 11.00 2.87 












Table A2. 4 Mixed logit models with interactions between payment mode attributes and 
farmers’ contracting history 
  Pooled sample SM farmers TC  farmers 
Parameters 
    ASC 0.89*** (0.26) 0.95*** (0.27) 0.99** (0.50) 0.80** (0.35) 
Price 0.33***(0.03) 0.34*** (0.03) 0.25*** (0.05) 0.33*** (0.03) 
Sales at a nearby market (place2) -1.08*** (0.24) -1.23*** (0.26) -0.39 (0.40) -1.17*** (0.30) 
Sales at buyers’ premise (place3) -0.82*** (0.24) -0.86*** (0.24) 0.08 (0.35) -1.04*** (0.28) 
Sold in washed and sorted form (form2) -0.35** (0.15) -0.33** (0.16) -0.38 (0.24) -0.36* (0.19) 
Sales as scheduled in contract (timing2) -0.19 (0.21) -0.25 (0.21) 0.38 (0.35) -0.33 (0.33) 
Sales based on phone orders (timing3) -0.87*** (0.24) -0.90*** (0.25) -0.42 (0.39) -1.21** (0.53) 
Payment delayed, for quantity delivered 
(payment2) -2.04*** (0.29) -1.79*** (0.29) 0.61 (0.42) -2.12*** (0.42) 
Payment delayed, for quantity sold to 
customers, physically verifiable (payment3) -4.70*** (0.52) -4.72*** (0.49) 2.04*** (0.78) -4.98*** (0.88) 
Payment delayed, for quantity sold to 
customers, verifiable through bar coding 
(payment4) -6.43*** (0.88) -5.91*** (0.62) -1.72** (0.83) -7.29*** (1.04) 
Payment delayed, for quantity sold to 
customers, not verifiable (payment5) -7.89*** (1.10) -7.75*** (1.13) 3.23*** (0.93) -7.47*** (1.51) 
Interactions 
    Payment2 x SM stayers (dummy) 2.75*** (0.56) 
 
-1.28** (0.51) 
 Payment3 x SM stayers (dummy) 2.46*** (0.68) 
 
-1.48 (0.90) 
 Payment4 x SM stayers (dummy) 4.51*** (1.19) 
 
3.30*** (1.21) 
 Payment5 x SM stayers (dummy) 4.18*** (1.26) 
 
-1.60 (1.23) 
 Payment2 x SM dropouts (dummy) -0.53 (0.71) 
 
-0.24 (1.33) 
Payment3 x SM dropouts (dummy) 0.77 (0.54) 
 
1.27** (0.53) 
Payment4 x SM dropouts (dummy) 0.31 (0.79) 
 
1.30 (0.87) 




    ASC 2.20*** (0.22) 2.22*** (0.20) 1.49*** (0.32) 2.22*** (0.30) 
Place2 1.06*** (0.28) 1.24*** (0.24) 0.50 (0.88) -0.72 (0.45) 
Place3 1.20*** (0.31) 1.46*** (0.28) 0.67 (0.58) 1.06*** (0.35) 
Form2 -0.22 (0.19) -0.004 (0.30) 0.12 (0.29) -0.05 (0.36) 
Timing2 -0.67 (0.51) -1.02** (0.44) -0.96 (0.66) 0.64 (0.39) 
Timing3 1.84*** (0.36) 1.94*** (0.34) 0.22 (0.56) -2.39** (1.11) 
Payment2 1.98*** (0.30) 2.13*** (0.30) -0.49 (0.50) 2.05** (1.02) 
Payment3 1.32** (0.53) 1.42*** (0.46) 1.74** (0.82) 0.65 (1.55) 
Payment4 2.42*** (0.62) 2.40*** (0.47) 1.84*** (0.65) 2.94*** (0.48) 
Payment5 3.20*** (0.83) 3.45*** (0.86) 2.08*** (0.79) 2.63*** (0.81) 
N (Number of observations) 7362 7362 1296 6066 
Log likelihood at start -1558.79 -1598.41 -339.67 -1201.35 
Log likelihood at convergence -1371.50 -1391.21 -313.48 -1038.48 
Wald chi2 (15) 186.21*** 186.39*** 89.71*** 182.56*** 
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.28 0.23 0.32 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown with standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual). The binary dependent variable is 
marketing channel (contract) choice. For place of sale, the reference is “farm gate” (place1). For form of sale, the reference is “sold as 
harvested” (form1). For time of sale, the reference is “at any time” (timing1). For payment mode, the reference is “payment immediate, 
based on quantity delivered” (payment1). ASC, alternative specific constant (refers to traditional channel without contract); SM, 
supermarket; TC, traditional channel; * *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table A2. 5 Mixed logit models with interactions between contract attributes and socioeconomic characteristics for SM farmers 
 Variables interacted with attribute levels 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age of household head 
(years) 
Education of household 
head (years) 
Annual household 




     …Place2 0.002 (0.03) 0.27 (0.19) 9.82e-05 (0.0002) 0.01 (0.71) -0.29 (0.93) 
…Place3 0.01 (0.03) 0.12 (0.14) 1.52e-05 (0.0002) 0.46 (0.63) -0.20 (0.92) 
…Form2 -0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.08) 7.92e-05 (7.87e-05) 0.57 (0.40) -0.36 (0.48) 
…Timing2 0.01 (0.03) -0.04 (0.11) -0.0001 (0.0001) 0.04 (0.54) 0.48 (0.80) 
…Timing3 0.02 (0.02) -0.10 (0.15) -7.87e-05 (0.0001) 0.53 (0.55) 0.06 (0.59) 
…Payment2 -0.02 (0.02) 0.10 (0.14) 0.0003* (0.0001) -0.53 (0.58) 0.04 (0.74) 
…Payment3 -0.01 (0.04) 0.13 (0.25) 0.0002 (0.0002) -1.24 (0.96) 1.35 (1.46) 
…Payment4 0.04 (0.05) -0.40 (0.35) 0.0002 (0.0003) -1.73* (0.90) 1.70 (1.59) 
…Payment5 0.01 (0.05) 0.11 (0.36) 0.0001 (0.0004) -2.13* (1.14) 3.01 (2.36) 
Parameters 
     ASC 0.96* (0.50) 1.17** (0.57) 1.01** (0.51) 1.10** (0.52) 0.94* (0.51) 
Price 0.25*** (0.06) 0.32** (0.13) 0.26*** (0.06) 0.26*** (0.05) 0.26*** (0.06) 
Place2 -0.51 (1.60) -3.63 (2.52) -0.60 (0.51) -0.45 (0.49) -0.40 (0.54) 
Place3 -0.67 (1.48) -1.32 (1.57) 0.12 (0.45) -0.08 (0.45) 0.13 (0.56) 
Form2 0.52 (1.01) -0.10 (0.95) -0.49* (0.28) -0.60** (0.29) -0.33 (0.37) 
Timing2 -0.37 (1.48) 0.81 (1.29) 0.47 (0.44) 0.34 (0.45) 0.21 (0.46) 
Timing3 -1.37 (1.23) 0.65 (1.60) -0.32 (0.44) -0.62 (0.45) -0.46 (0.52) 
Payment2 0.79 (1.31) -1.30 (1.70) -0.45 (0.43) 0.18 (0.47) -0.13 (0.46) 
Payment3 -2.22 (2.35) -5.31 (4.39) -3.34*** (1.23) -2.29** (0.94) -3.70* (2.22) 
Payment4 -4.92 (3.86) -0.21 (2.43) -3.31*** (0.79) -2.24** (0.90) -4.04* (2.35) 









  ASC 1.57*** (0.39) 1.73*** (0.60) 1.57*** (0.56) 1.57*** (0.29) 1.55*** (0.57) 
Place2 0.84 (0.60) -1.38 (1.30) 0.91(0.72) 0.67 (0.54) 0.93 (0.99) 
Place3 0.82 (0.97) 1.49 (1.26) -0.99 (1.25) 0.46 (0.90) 0.88 (0.98) 
Form2 0.07 (0.39) -0.69 (0.75) 0.08 (0.37) 0.09 (0.27) 0.27 (0.43) 
Timing2 0.94 (0.77) -1.20 (0.95) 1.24 (0.85) -0.94 (0.71) 1.31 (1.24) 
Timing3 -0.23 (0.46) 0.72 (0.74) -0.04 (2.16) 0.15 (0.26) 0.14 (0.92) 
Payment2 0.14 (0.76) -0.39 (0.51) 0.26 (0.72) -0.58 (0.41) 1.10 (1.88) 
Payment3 1.80 (1.17) 2.72 (1.96) 1.94* (1.05) 1.90* (1.08) 2.35 (2.18) 
Payment4 1.64 (2.10) -3.65 (2.46) 1.48 (0.92) -1.86** (0.74) 2.11 (1.56) 
Payment5 2.32 (2.59) 2.69 (2.38) 2.51 (2.81) 1.68** (0.76) -1.74 (3.49) 
LL at start 347.68 346.00 347.62 345.40 343.53 
LL at convergence 320.86 315.93 318.45 316.48 315.92 
Wald chi² (20) 67.58*** 33.34*** 108.33*** 87.67*** 62.97*** 
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown with standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual). The binary dependent variable is marketing channel (contract) choice. 
N=1296. LL, log likelihood;  Place2, nearby market; Place3, buyers’ premise; Form2, sold in washed and sorted form; Timing2, sales at times specified in the contract; Timing3, 
sales based on phone orders; Payment2, payment delayed, for quantity delivered. Payment3, payment delayed, for quantity sold to customers, physically verifiable; Payment4, 
payment delayed, for quantity sold to customers, verifiable through bar coding; Payment5, payment delayed, for quantity sold to customers, not verifiable. For place of sale, the 
reference is “farm gate” (place1). For form of sale, the reference is “sold as harvested” (form1). For time of sale, the reference is “at any time” (timing1). For payment mode, the 
reference is “payment immediate, based on quantity delivered” (payment1). ASC, alternative specific constant (refers to traditional channel without contract); SM, supermarket. *, 







Table A2. 6 Mixed logit models with interactions between contract attributes and socioeconomic characteristics for TC farmers 
 Variables interacted with attribute levels 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age of household head 
(years) 
Education of household 
head (years) 
Annual household 




     …Place2 -0.04** (0.02) 0.15** (0.06) 2.99e-05 (0.0004) 0.54 (0.44) -2.01 (1.46) 
…Place3 -0.002 (0.02) -0.04 (0.06) 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.21 (0.43) -0.50 (0.92) 
…Form2 -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.05) 0.0003 (0.0002) 0.23 (0.30) -0.28 (0.81) 
…Timing2 -0.01 (0.01) 0.09** (0.05) -0.001** (0.0003) -0.27 (0.38) 1.48* (0.87) 
…Timing3 0.04 (0.03) -0.08 (0.09) -0.0003 (0.0006) 0.33 (0.56) -0.20 (1.42) 
…Payment2 0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.07) 0.0007* (0.0004) -0.52 (0.52) 0.71 (1.29) 
…Payment3 0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.08) 0.0001 (0.0005) 0.17 (0.55) 1.98 (1.58) 
…Payment4 0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.12) -0.002** (0.0009) -0.83 (1.11) 1.59 (1.59) 
…Payment5 0.03 (0.04) 0.17 (0.17) -0.001 (0.001) -4.89*** (0.99) -0.13 (2.64) 
Parameters 
     ASC 0.85** (0.35) 0.75** (0.32) 0.80** (0.32) 0.82*** (0.31) 0.79** (0.32) 
Price 0.35*** (0.04) 0.35*** (0.04) 0.36*** (0.05) 0.34*** (0.04) 0.36*** (0.04) 
Place2 0.50 (0.82) -2.64*** (0.74) -1.31*** (0.48) -1.49*** (0.38) -1.39*** (0.31) 
Place3 -1.13 (0.96) -0.72 (0.67) -1.23*** (0.41) -1.19*** (0.34) -1.24*** (0.32) 
Form2 0.01 (0.70) -0.28 (0.53) -0.51** (0.24) -0.41* (0.24) -0.30 (0.22) 
Timing2 0.20 (0.80) -1.27** (0.51) -0.70** (0.28) -0.20 (0.27) -0.39 (0.26) 
Timing3 -3.27** (1.33) -0.36 (0.86) -0.94**  (0.38) -1.20*** (0.43) -1.06*** (0.37) 
Payment2 -2.74** (1.23) -2.65*** (0.82) -2.70*** (0.40) -2.07*** (0.38) -2.46*** (0.39) 
Payment3 -6.36*** (1.35) -4.92*** (1.05) -5.15*** (0.99) -4.73*** (0.45) -5.55*** (0.77) 
Payment4 -8.18*** (1.96) -6.77*** (1.34) -6.23*** (1.16) -6.76*** (0.95) -6.51*** (0.78) 









  ASC 2.20*** (0.24) 2.33*** (0.29) 2.33*** (0.30) 2.25*** (0.25) 2.28*** (0.28) 
Place2 -1.00** (0.44) -0.18 (0.74) 1.02 (0.74) 0.99* (0.52) -1.44*** (0.35) 
Place3 1.56*** (0.41) 1.23*** (0.47) 1.40** (0.55) 1.33*** (0.45) -1.52*** (0.39) 
Form2 -0.45 (0.34) -0.57* (0.33) -0.37* (0.22) -0.37** (0.17) 0.47 (0.39) 
Timing2 -1.23*** (0.38) 0.62 (0.53) 0.47 (0.52) 0.40 (0.53) 0.82 (0.51) 
Timing3 -2.00*** (0.48) 2.51*** (0.44) 2.39*** (0.47) 2.31*** (0.51) 2.39*** (0.42) 
Payment2 2.38*** (0.54) 2.57*** (0.47) 2.67*** (0.42) 2.52*** (0.38) 2.51*** (0.42) 
Payment3 1.45** (0.67) 1.18 (0.83) 1.31 (1.18) 0.33 (0.65) -1.39** (0.54) 
Payment4 2.52*** (0.59) 2.67*** (0.63) 2.84** (1.11) 3.01 (2.14) 2.14*** (0.39) 
Payment5 3.61*** (0.98) 3.29*** (1.04) 3.31*** (0.80) 2.83*** (0.56) 4.40*** (0.96) 
LL at start 1197.72 1199.85 1199.22 1198.42 1200.69 
LL at convergence 1033.03 1033.92 1034.90 1033.02 1036.15 
Wald chi² (20) 149.16*** 166.80*** 151.56*** 203.39*** 144.60*** 
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown with standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual). The binary dependent variable is marketing channel (contract) choice. 
N=6066. LL, log likelihood; Place2, nearby market; Place3, buyers’ premise; Form2, sold in washed and sorted form; Timing2, sales at times specified in the contract; Timing3, 
sales based on phone orders; Payment2, payment delayed, for quantity delivered. Payment3, payment delayed, for quantity sold to customers, physically verifiable; Payment4, 
payment delayed, for quantity sold to customers, verifiable through bar coding; Payment5, payment delayed, for quantity sold to customers, not verifiable. For place of sale, the 
reference is “farm gate” (place1). For form of sale, the reference is “sold as harvested” (form1). For time of sale, the reference is “at any time” (timing1). For payment mode, the 
reference is “payment immediate, based on quantity delivered” (payment1). ASC, alternative specific constant (refers to traditional channel without contract); TC, traditional 





3 Supermarket Contracts, Income, and Changing Diets of Farm 
Households: Panel Data Evidence from Kenya6 
Abstract 
In many developing countries, supermarkets are increasingly replacing traditional markets as 
preferred points of food purchases in urban areas. This has welfare implications on 
smallholder farmers that supply supermarkets. While previous studies have analyzed the 
welfare effects of smallholder participation in supermarket channels, many have focused on 
economic effects alone. Very little is known about the effects on farm household diets. 
Besides, most existing studies that have looked at economic effects used cross-sectional data 
that are limited in controlling for time-invariant differences between supermarket and 
traditional channel farmers. This study uses panel data from vegetable farmers in Kenya to 
examine the effects of supermarket contracting on farm household income and diets. 
Supplying supermarkets has increased household income by 66%, and is associated with 8% 
higher consumption of calories, as well as better dietary diversity, and higher levels of zinc 
consumption. Using these results for simple simulations suggests that wider participation of 
smallholders in supermarket channels could reduce the prevalence of undernourishment by 
8% and the prevalence of zinc deficiency by 12%. Hence, enhancing smallholder market 
access could significantly contribute to reduction of undernourishment and micronutrient 
malnutrition and to increases in the incomes of rural farm households. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
For most agro-dependent economies, smallholder agriculture contributes significantly to the 
aggregate agricultural output. Agricultural production is dominated by smallholder farms that 
employ majority of rural populations. Statistics for developing countries show that 70% of 
human populations reside in rural areas and rely on agriculture as main source of livelihood 
(FAO, 2014; World Bank, 2016). Incidences of poverty and hunger remain high in the rural 
areas of many developing countries. Global statistics also show that about 800 million people 
are hungry while another 2 billion suffer from micronutrients deficiencies – largely rural 
populations (Horton and Lo, 2013; IFPRI, 2016).  
 
                                                          





Alternative employment opportunities outside of agriculture are also limited for the rural 
populations in developing countries where manufacturing sector is less vibrant (Wiggins et 
al., 2010). Hence, smallholder farming takes the center stage in creating employment and 
rural development, and reducing poverty and hunger (World Bank 2007; Gautam et al., 2016). 
For sustainability of the emerging high-value chains and of accruing benefits, efforts to 
enhance smallholder production capacities and market access are important (Hazell et al., 
2010). From poverty reduction and equity perspective, access to these markets would not only 
increase incomes, reduce poverty and widening inequalities, hunger and malnutrition, but also 
have wider spillover effects to the rural non-farm sector. This could generate off-farm 
employment and stimulate growth of the rural economy.  
Market access is one major constraint to the viability of smallholder farming due to the 
relatively small-scale farm operation and the high transaction costs occasioned by market 
imperfections in developing countries (Hazell et al., 2010; Escobal et al., 2012). Contract 
farming is one of the pathways to widening smallholder farmers’ access to high-value 
markets. This could be in the form of production or marketing contracts that are widespread in 
the domestic and export markets for horticultural products in many developing countries 
(Otsuka et al., 2016). Contract farming stabilizes prices and volumes traded while offering 
assured market to farmers thus could potentially increase incomes of contracted farmers. 
Increased globalization has expanded trade in processed and fresh foods across countries 
along with dynamic transformation of agri-food systems, often with far-reaching implications 
on agricultural production (Jenkins, 2004; Hazell et al., 2010). These developments have led 
to increased integration of the food marketing systems and spread of supermarkets in what has 
been described by Reardon et al (2012) as “supermarket revolution”. The spread first began in 
Central America before spreading to Asia, and currently beginning to take shape in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Supermarkets are increasingly replacing traditional retailers and wet markets 
as preferred shopping outlets by largely urban populations (Qaim, 2017). This is occasioned 
by rising incomes, urbanization and emerging urban middle classes, dynamic tastes and 
preferences of consumers, growing demand for variety of foods, and desire for shopping 
convenience among the more affluent segments of the populations (Reardon and Timmer, 
2014; Tschirley et al., 2015). These demand and supply side factors have significantly 
contributed to nutrition transition in developing countries (Mergenthaler et al., 2009; Gómez, 





The rapid supermarket growth has broad implications on food retailing and access to variety 
of foods, and farm production of fresh foods demanded by supermarkets. Two strands of 
literature analyze the welfare effects of supermarkets. On the one hand, the impacts (through 
supermarket purchases) are analyzed in terms of household or individual level nutrition 
effects of food purchases from supermarkets (Asfaw, 2008; Popkin, 2014; Umberger et al., 
2015; Kimenju et al., 2016). Supermarkets stock diverse nutritious foods as well as energy-
dense and highly processed foods.  
On the other hand, from the supply side, welfare effects of supermarket contracting on farm 
households are analyzed. Existing studies focus on farm profits, farm productivity, assets 
accumulation, on-farm and off-farm employment, and changes in gender roles among other 
issues (Miyata et al., 2009; Neven et al., 2009; Rao and Qaim, 2011; Michelson, 2013; Rao 
and Qaim, 2013; Chege et al., 2015). Hence, supermarket growth could contribute to the 
modernization of the small farm sector and widen market access by smallholder farmers, with 
far reaching welfare implications. This study contributes to the latter strand of literature with a 
focus on contractual arrangements between rural smallholder farmers and supermarkets. 
Supermarkets are modernizing their food procurement systems and increasingly sourcing 
FFVs directly from farmers (Chege et al., 2015). It is important to understand how the spread 
of supermarkets affect welfare of contracted farm households given the dynamic participation 
in such high value channels.  
While previous studies have analyzed the welfare effects of smallholder participation in 
supermarket channels, many have focused on economic effects alone. Very little is known 
about the effects on farm household diets. Besides, most existing studies that have looked at 
economic effects used cross-sectional data that yield potentially biased results due to 
endogeneity problems. This study fills the literature and knowledge gap on the effects of 
supermarket contracting on household incomes and diets using panel data from a sample of 
vegetable farmers of Central Kenya. The study first analyzes the effects on household income 
before analyzing the effects on household diets - in terms of dietary diversity, as well as 
calories and micronutrient (iron, zinc and vitamin A) consumption. The hypotheses are that 
supermarket contracting increases household incomes, calories and micronutrients 
consumption, and dietary diversity. 
Recent studies show that resource-constrained smallholder farmers are excluded from high-
value markets due to the stringent consistency, timeliness, volumetric, food safety and quality 





2015; Chege et al., 2015).  This has led to high drop-out rates in the supermarket channels, 
also partially attributed to unfavorable contractual arrangements that expose farmers to 
marketing risks (Ochieng et al., 2017).   However, the farmers that overcome the hurdles are 
expected to benefit significantly from such marketing arrangements. 
 
3.2 The Study Context 
Kenya’s economy is largely dependent on agriculture as a foreign exchange earner. The sector 
contributes significantly to the gross domestic product (GDP) and employs majority of the 
rural populations (Olwande et al., 2015). Currently, Kenya’s human population stands at 46 
million and is estimated to increase by 3% by year 2030 (PRB, 2017). About 70% of the 
population reside in rural areas and rely on smallholder agriculture as main source of 
livelihood, on 5% of rural farmlands (Muyanga and Jayne, 2015). Poverty and prevalence of 
undernourishment and micronutrient malnutrition remains widespread particularly in the rural 
areas of Kenya (KNBS, 2008; RoK, 2012). 
Hence, smallholder agriculture could significantly contribute to poverty reduction and 
improved food security among rural farm households, and enhance growth of the rural 
economy in Kenya.  As earlier mentioned, contract farming is one of the pathways to widen 
smallholder access to markets while reducing transaction costs when engaging with 
smallholder farmers. In Kenya, it is widely practiced in both the domestic (e.g. supermarkets) 
and export markets for horticultural products (Okello and Swinnton, 2007; Asfaw et al., 2009; 
Neven et al., 2009). Kenya ranks second after South Africa with respect to growth of 
supermarkets that currently account for 10% of national retail and 20% of grocery sales in 
urban areas (Planet Retail, 2017).  
Supermarkets offer variety of fresh and processed foods to consumers in Kenya and are also 
modernizing their food procurement systems in the wake of food safety and quality concerns 
to procure FFVs directly from farmers. This initially involved contracting medium and large-
scale farmers that could meet the stringent volumetric, timeliness, and quality requirements. 
However, supermarkets began contracting smallholder farmers as they expanded to other 
smaller towns (Chege et al., 2015). Such contracts provide opportunity for smallholder 






3.3 Materials and Methods 
3.3.1 Study Area 
This study focuses on smallholder farmers of Kiambu County of Central Kenya. Kiambu is 
one of the high potential regions of Kenya with favorable climatic conditions for agricultural 
production. Farmers in the region practice mixed farming, cultivating staples and cash crops, 
and rearing livestock on small pieces of lands. Household survey was conducted in Kikuyu, 
Limuru, and Githunguri areas of Kiambu County. 
The County provides appropriate setting for this study for the following reasons. First, the 
region borders the capital city where demand for FFVs is increasing due to growing human 
populations and expansion of satellite towns (Ayieko et al., 2005). This presents marketing 
opportunity for vegetable farmers. Second, the region is densely populated, with the rural 
households mainly engaged in farming as the main source of livelihood (KNBS, 2008). 
Poverty rate and prevalence of undernourishment and micronutrient deficiencies is high in 
rural areas (KNBS, 2008). Third, Kiambu is one of the major FFVs producing regions of 
Kenya, and a major source of FFVs for the supermarkets in Nairobi (Neven et al., 2009; 
Ochieng et al., 2017). Lastly, the perishable nature of FFVs and volatile prices across seasons 
presents a unique marketing problem to farmers, which substantially influence farm profits. 
Hence, it is important to analyze the effects of supermarket contracting on farm household 
income and diets. 
 
3.3.2 Data Collection 
This study builds on a panel survey conducted over several years. Stratified random sampling 
procedure was employed to randomly sample 402 farmers from 31 administrative locations 
within Kiambu in year 2008 (Rao and Qaim, 2011). The sample comprised traditional channel 
(TC) and supermarket (SM) channel farmers. Face-to-face interviews were conducted using a 
structured questionnaire. Subsequent follow-up surveys were carried out in years 2012 and 
2015. Table A2.2 of appendix to chapter 2 provides a summary of characteristics of SM and 






























The breakdown by group of farmers in Table 3.1 shows how the number of contracted 
(supermarket) farmers declined over time. It is important to mention that 9 farm households 
interviewed in 2015 are excluded from the following analysis due to incomplete data. 
Respondents were the household heads, their spouses or household members responsible for 
vegetable production and marketing, and the persons responsible for food preparation in the 
household (for the nutrition section). 
 
3.3.3 Data 
Measuring household income 
This study exploits unbalanced panel data from all the three rounds of survey to analyze effect 
of supermarket contracting on farm household income. The questionnaire included socio-
demographic characteristics of the farm households, focusing on farm production and 
marketing activities. In particular, a detailed section on vegetable production and supermarket 
contracts was included. These data allowed for computation of annual household incomes. 
Farm income was computed from crop and livestock revenues and corresponding costs 
incurred by the farm enterprises. Off-farm income comprised earnings from off-farm and non-
farm activities including remittances. These estimates of household income in all the survey 
rounds were adjusted for inflation using consumer price indices.  
Measuring calorie and micronutrient consumption 
Nutrition related questions were only included in the 2012 and 2015 survey rounds so that 
effects of supermarket contracting on household diets are analyzed using unbalanced panel 
data from the two survey rounds. The questionnaire detailed types and quantities of foods 
consumed from own production, gifts, and purchases by the households for more than 180 
food items based on a 7-day recalls. This allowed for computation of quantities calories 





of access to adequate quantities of energy and foods for healthy living (FAO, 2001). 
Household dietary diversity was computed using a score as discussed below and is a robust 
indicator of household food access due to its positive and significant association with all 
measures of calorie consumption (Leroy et al., 2015). 
The weekly quantities of foods consumed were converted into nutrient equivalents per 100 
grams using food conversion tables for Kenya, while correcting for edible portions of food 
(Sehmi, 1993).  The daily consumption estimates were determined by dividing the weekly 
calories and micronutrients consumed were divided by 7. These daily estimates were further 
divided by adult equivalents (AE) for Kenya to obtain the quantities consumed per AE, so that 
comparisons between households are possible. The AE accounts for age and levels of physical 
activity of each household member. 
We accounted for micronutrient losses from food preparation that affects nutrient availability 
(Bognár, 2002), and issues of bioavailability that depend on diets as well as inhibitors or 
enhancers of zinc and iron absorption by the body. Micronutrient analysis assumed iron 
bioavailability of 5% , which is within suggested range of 5% to 15% (WHO and FAO, 2004) 
and zinc bioavailability of 15%, assuming unrefined cereal based diets as common in Kenya 
(IZiNCG, 2004; WHO and FAO, 2004). Calorie and micronutrient deficiencies are 
determined by comparing the estimated consumption levels against the prescribed standard 
levels of 15mg of zinc, 18.3 mg of iron, and 625 µg retinol equivalent (RE) of vitamin A per 
AE and day. For calories, daily intake of 3000 Kcal per AE and day is recommended for 
moderately active male adults in Kenya (WHO and FAO, 2004). A household is 
undernourished if the consumption level falls below 80% of the recommended level, meaning 
2400Kcal per AE and day (FAO et al., 2001). 
Measuring household dietary diversity 
Household dietary diversity provides the general overview of nutritional status of the 
household (Leroy et al., 2015). Twelve food groups were used to calculate household dietary 
diversity score (HDDS). The groups comprised: vegetables; white tubers and roots; cereals; 
legumes; nuts and seeds; fruits; oils and fats; meat; fish and fish products; milk and dairy 
products; eggs; sweets and sugars; condiments, spices and beverages. Scores were assigned 
using a count of food groups consumed in the reference period as done in other nutrition-
related studies (Jones et al., 2014; Herforth and Ballard, 2016; Koppmair et al., 2017). HDDS 





energy dense yet micronutrient poor food groups such a fat and oils, condiments, spices and 
beverages, and sweets and sugars (Sibhatu et al., 2015). This provides a snapshot of 
micronutrient density of the diets a well a robustness check on the estimations a will be shown 
in the results section. 
 
3.3.4 Estimation Procedure 
This section discusses the model specifications used to analyze the effects of supermarket 
contracting on household income and diets. A binary treatment variable (supermarket 
participation) in all the specifications assumes a value of one if the farmer is contracted by 
supermarkets and zero if not. The dietary outcomes refer to the household daily consumption 
of calorie, zinc, iron, and vitamin A per AE, and dietary diversity. Considering the panel 
structure of the data, we use random effects (RE), fixed effects (FE) and ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimators for analysis. Household income or dietary outcomes are regressed 
on supermarket participation (dummy) while controlling for other factors that may also 
influence income and diets as shown in the specification below: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑆𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + u𝑖𝑡    (1) 
where Y is either household income, calorie and micronutrients consumed per AE, or dietary 
diversity score. SM is the treatment variable. Subscripts index household i=1, 2,…, N and 
time, t=1, 2,…,T. 𝑋𝑖 are the time variant characteristics whereas Zi are individual time-
invariant characteristics. αi captures unobserved characteristics, independent and identically 
distributed – IDD (0, σα2) and the error term, uit is IID (0, σu2) both independent of  each other 
and among themselves (Wooldridge, 2010). The hypothesis is that supplying supermarkets 
improve income, calorie and micronutrients consumption, and household dietary diversity, 
that is 𝜸>0. 
The other controls (𝑋𝑖) are; age, gender, and education level of the household head, farm size, 
and household size. These factors may influence farmer participation in supermarket 
channels. For example, age and education level of farmers influence access to market 
information, managerial abilities, and farmers’ willingness to contract or adopt of production 
technologies. Farm size is a proxy for farm household wealth status whereas household size 
(per adult equivalent) indicates availability of family labor, which is important for labor-





contracting could affect participation in off-farm activities. Including region dummies 
captures any heterogeneity across the regions. However, there may be other unobserved 
factors (or differences) between farm households that influence incomes besides the 
aforementioned factors e.g. farmers’ entrepreneurial skills and motivation, and location 
specific factors (climate, elevation, and soils that favor crop production).  
The unobserved heterogeneity between SM and TC farmers may yield biased estimates. Fixed 
effects estimator controls for this, providing unbiased estimates. For the household income 
model, the P-value for the Hausman test is significant so that the null hypothesis that the 
difference in the coefficients is not systematic is rejected (Hausman, 1978). Hence, FE 
estimator is appropriate as shown in the following discussion. 
For the dietary outcome models, the P-values for the Hausman test are insignificant so that 
the null hypothesis that the differences in the coefficients are not systematic cannot be 
rejected. Hence, RE estimator is appropriate. Breusch-Pagan test also confirmed that OLS 
specification is not appropriate. Both RE and OLS estimates are shown in the following 
empirical results section. The RE estimator does not control for unobserved heterogeneity of 
the farmers. Individual regressors are assumed exogenous (not correlated with individual 
effects). Hence, the treatment coefficients are interpreted as associations between supermarket 
contracting and household diets.  
Beyond the Hausman test, RE estimator is appropriate in this case for two reasons. First, only 
two rounds of panel data is available for dietary outcome estimations such that using FE 
estimator would halve the degrees of freedom. Consequently, the tails of t-distribution 
thicken, implying that the coefficients are estimated with greater uncertainty (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2004; Townsend et al., 2013). Secondly, there is little within-group variation in the 
covariates, meaning the covariates would be highly correlated with the fixed effects thereby 
rendering FE estimator inefficient (Wooldridge, 2010; Bell and Jones, 2015).  
We perform simple simulations to assess the possible significance of the magnitude of the 
treatment effects on dietary outcomes by adding the mean coefficients of the treatment 
variable to the current consumption levels and then re-estimating the levels of calorie and 
micronutrient deficiency. This way, we are able to assess the economic relevance of the 





3.4. Results and Discussion 
3.4.1 Farm and Household Characteristics 
Table 3.2 provides a summary of farm and household characteristics from pooled sample 
(2008-2015). The SM and TC farmers differ in most of the characteristics. Majority of the 
farm households are male-headed. The household heads are about 51 years of age, with about 
nine years of schooling. The average farm size is about 2 acres. The average farm household 
comprises three persons (adult equivalent).  Detailed descriptive statistics by group of farmers 
and survey rounds are in Table A2.2 of appendix to chapter 2.  
Table 3. 2 Characteristics of the farmers (pooled sample) 
Variable Full sample 
 
SM farmers TC farmers 
Total income (1000 ksh) 436.32 (763.05) 
 
749.36*** (1294.49) 335.01 (442.85) 
Male household head (dummy) 88.03 (32.48) 
 
83.79*** (24.17) 86.16 (34.55) 
Age of household head (years) 51.74 (14.09) 
 
49.60 (12.85) 52.43 (14.40) 
Education level of farmer (years) 9.48 (3.75) 
 
10.54*** (3.18) 9.14 (3.86) 
Off-farm income (dummy) 65.35 (47.61) 
 
72.76*** (44.60) 62.95 (48.32) 
Farm size (acres) 1.98 (3.10) 
 
2.62*** (4.69) 1.78 (2.34) 
Household size (AE) 2.59 (1.18) 
 
2.93 (1.15) 2.48 (1.16) 
N (number of observations) 1186 
 
290 896 
Notes: values are means with standard deviation in parentheses; SM, supermarket; TC, traditional channel; Ksh, Kenya shillings; 
AE, Adult equivalent; *, **,***Mean values between SM and TC farmers  are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 3.3 presents a summary of the household dietary indicators by marketing channels from 
pooled sample (2012-2015). SM farmers consume 3% more calories than TC farmers and are 
less undernourished by a similar magnitude. The households have an average dietary diversity 
score of 8.77, a sign of access to adequate quantities of food. More than half of the sampled 
households are iron deficient. Overall, the differences in the estimates between SM and TC 































































Dietary diversity score 8.77 1.40  9.17 1.24  8.67 1.42 





 Notes: Values are means; SD, standard deviation; SM, supermarket ; TC, traditional channel;  Kcal, Kilo calories; AE, adult 
equivalent; RE, retinol equivalent; mg, milligrams; thresholds of deficiency is 2400Kcal for calories, 625 µg RE for vitamin A, 
18.3mg for iron, and 15mg for zinc. The differences in the indicators between the groups are not statistically significant. 
 
 
3.4.2 Empirical Results 
Supermarket contracting and household income 
Table 3.4 presents the model results from household income specification. Controlling for 
other factors, Supplying supermarket has increased farm household income by Ksh 222,000 – 
a 66% increase above the mean income of TC farmers. This is plausible, given the accruing 
benefits from supplying supermarkets. The channel offers stable and better prices to farmers 
compared to the traditional channel where prices are volatile across seasons. Hence, with 
assured market and stable prices, farmers are able to coordinate production and marketing 
activities thus possibly realize higher farm profits than TC farmers. Supermarket channel also 
has stringent quality and volumetric requirements that involve substantial farm investments in 
production technologies including farm inputs and irrigation equipment to facilitate year-
round production and post-harvest handling equipment. Income growth facilitates such 
investments, leading to greater output and better quality produce thus minimizing product 








Table 3. 4 Supermarket contracting and household income 
  Model (1) 
 
Model (2) 
Variables Total income (RE model) 
 
Total income (FE model) 
SM participation (dummy)a 330.02*** (95.88) 
 
222.17** (112.48) 
2012 (dummy)b 373.60** (155.69) 
 
268.51* (151.03) 
2015 (dummy)b 604.55*** (230.19) 
 
406.33* (226.46) 
Age of  household head (years) -0.88 (1.91) 
 
3.15 (3.09) 
Male household head (dummy) 83.80* (48.65) 
 
-7.65 (54.63) 
Education level of farmer (years) 23.21*** (7.16) 
 
24.82** (11.90) 
Off-farm income (dummy) 128.27*** (31.97) 
 
82.11 (49.90) 
Farm size (acres) 52.02*** (17.30) 
 
2.23 (24.00) 
Household size (AE) 114.09 (96.79) 
 
48.30 (89.53) 
Kikuyu (dummy)c -2.78 (58.18) 
 
- 
Githunguri (dummy)c 1.87 (60.29) 
 
- 
Westlands (dummy)c 79.77 (145.62) 
 
- 
Constant -702.59* (414.25) 
 
-416.44 (343.11) 






Hausman test (chi-square statistic) 20.65** 
  Notes: The dependent variable is total household income, values deflated for comparisons across years; Robust standard 
errors in parentheses; SM, supermarket; RE, Random effects; FE, Fixed effects; AE, Adult equivalent;  *, **,*** Significant at 
the 5%, and 1% level, respectively ; a Reference group is traditional channel farmers.b Reference year is 2008. c Reference 
region is Lari/Limuru 
 
The income effect is comparable to those of previous studies. Rao et al (2011) estimated that 
supplying supermarkets increased household income by 48% whereas Chege et al (2015) 
estimated an increase by over 60%. Supplying supermarkets is also associated with reduced 
poverty rates (Rao et al., 2011). In a broader context, the magnitude of the effect is 
comparable to those from other studies that look at effects of smallholder participation in 
other high-value channels in developing countries (Maertens et al., 2012; Van den Broeck et 
al., 2016). The results suggest that smallholder participation in high-value channels increase 
household income substantially. 
 
Supermarket contracting and household diets 
We examine examines the association between supermarket contracting and household 
dietary outcomes as well as dietary diversity. Table 3.5 provides a summary of the model 
results but detailed results are in Tables A3.1, A3.2, and A3.3 in the appendix to chapter 3.  
Supplying supermarkets is associated with positive and significant changes in consumption of 





265 Kcal per AE and day higher calorie consumption - a 8% increase compared to the average 
consumption by TC farmers, consume 9% more zinc, and increase their dietary diversity by 
2%. Dietary diversity is highly correlated with calorie consumption (Leroy et al., 2015). We 
do not find significant effects on vitamin A and iron consumption. 
The treatment coefficient remains positive and statistically significant when only 9 groups are 
included. The treatment effect on dietary diversity is relatively small, possibly because the 
average HDDS for the farm households is already high. Using the estimated dietary effects for 
simple simulations suggests that wider participation of farmers in supermarket channels could 
help to reduce the prevalence of undernourishment by 8% and zinc deficiency by 12%.  
Overall, results suggest that supermarkets could potentially improve household dietary 
diversity, consumption of calorie, and micronutrients. 






HDDS 2  Zinc(mg/day/AE) 
RE OLS  RE OLS  RE OLS  RE OLS 
















Values are coefficients of treatment variable with robust standard errors  in parentheses, clustered at household level; Kcal, 
kilocalories; AE, adult equivalent; HDDS, household dietary diversity score computed from 12 food groups; mg, milligram; 
RE, random effects; OLS, Ordinary least squares regression; SM: supermarket; *, **,*** Significant at the 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively; dependent variables are calorie and zinc intake, HDDS 1 and HDDS 2 computed using 12 and 9 food groups, 
respectively. Full model estimates are in appendix to chapter 3.  
 
These findings show a positive and significant association between supplying supermarkets 
and household income. Cash income facilitates economic access to adequate, safe and quality 
foods particularly in situations of well-functioning food markets (Jones et al., 2014). 
However, we do not analyze income pathway here. It should be noted that the estimates are 
only measures of food availability at household level and not household food security. Some 
studies suggest that supermarkets increase availability and accessibility of cheap, energy-
dense but less nutritious, resulting in micronutrients malnutrition and obesity (Popkin, 2014; 
Kimenju et al., 2015). However, considering the study area and the estimated prevalence of 
undernourishment and micronutrient deficiencies, there is no reason to believe that the 








For HDDS estimation, it could be argued that the result is driven by how HDDS is measured. 
Hence, as a robustness check, additional dietary diversity score is computed (HDDS2) that 
only includes 9 food groups in the HDDS. The excluded food groups are; sweets and sugars, 
fats and oils, and condiments, spices and beverages. These food groups comprise energy 
dense but nutrient poor foods. HDDS 2 now captures the dietary quality component of access 
to food (Leroy et al, 2015). The treatment effects remain significant as shown in Table 3.5. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This study examines the effects of supermarket contracting farm household income and diets.  
Panel regression results suggest that supermarket contracting has positive and significant 
effects on income, and is associated with improved dietary diversity as wells as consumption 
of calories and micronutrients. Specifically, the results confirm that supplying supermarkets 
has increased farm household income by 66%, and is associated with increased consumption 
of calorie by 8% and zinc by 9%, and improvement in household dietary diversity. We do not 
find significant treatment effects on vitamin A and iron consumption. Using these results for 
simple simulations suggests that wider participation of smallholders in supermarket channels 
could significantly reduce the prevalence of undernourishment and the prevalence of zinc 
deficiency.  
The findings should be interpreted with caution since supplying supermarkets and the 
potential spillover effects to traditional channel farmers are not analyzed. The effects could 
also be heterogeneous depending of context and nature of agricultural produce as seen in 
contract farming literature (Bellemare, 2012; Narayanan, 2014). Previous studies have 
highlighted high drop-out rates of smallholder farmers from supermarket channels due to 
stringent consistency, volumetric and quality requirements, and contract design in general. 
The challenges are also exacerbated by market imperfections that pervade the agricultural 
sector in developing countries, leading to high transaction costs even for farmers that market 
individually. Andersson et al (2015) find that income gains from supplying supermarkets 
erode when smallholder farmers drop out of the channel. This means that the improvements in 
diets could also diminish once the farmers exit the high-value channels. Overcoming the 






From a rural development perspective, policies that widen smallholder access to markets are 
important. Policy initiatives that improve rural road infrastructure could facilitate access to 
markets, reduce transportation cost and time, and improve produce quality thereby reducing 
product rejection rates witnessed in supermarket channel (Andersson et al., 2015). Facilitating 
efficient operations of farmer groups could also be beneficial in reducing the costs. This could 
be through public-private sector partnerships that also improve relations between farmers and 
supermarkets or other buyers. This facilitates greater transparency on important contract 
issues e.g. grading mechanisms for fairness in pricing thereby ensuring sustainability of 
smallholder participation in high-value chains. 
 
Supermarket growth in sub-Saharan Africa and Kenya in particular, could have significant 
welfare effects on rural farm households given the rapid urbanization, rising urban middle 
class, rising supermarket share of domestic retailing, supermarket expansion to other smaller 
cities, and their contracts with smallholder farmers for supplies of fresh horticultural produce. 
The spillover effects such as off-farm labor employment could significantly contribute to 
growth of the rural economy, household incomes, and diets. Overall, the study findings 
suggest that supplying supermarkets could significantly benefit rural smallholder farmers 
through increased incomes and improved household diets. This contributes to reduction of 
poverty and the burden of undernourishment and micronutrients malnutrition that is 



















Appendix to Chapter 3 
Table A3. 1 Supermarket contracting and HDDS 2 -Robustness check 




SM participation (dummy)a 0.24*** 
 
0.28*** 
  (0.08) 
 
(0.08) 
Year 2015 (dummy) b -0.97*** 
 
-0.99*** 
  (0.09) 
 
(0.10) 
Male household head (dummy) 0.02 
 
-0.02 
  (0.12) 
 
(0.12) 
Education of household head (years) 0.05*** 
 
0.05*** 
  (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Off-farm income (1000 Ksh) -0.14* 
 
-0.12 
  (0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
Farm land owned (acres) 0.03*** 
 
0.03*** 
  (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Household size (AE) -0.12* 
 
-0.13** 
  (0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
Kikuyu region (dummy) c 0.09 
 
0.10 
  (0.08) 
 
(0.07) 
Githunguri region (dummy) c -0.20 
 
-0.21* 
  (0.13) 
 
(0.12) 
Westlands region (dummy) c 0.27 
 
0.24 






  (0.34) 
 
(0.35) 
Wald chi2 (10) 312.11*** 
 
- 






Notes: Observations=784; Robust standard errors in parentheses; SM, supermarket; RE, Random effects; 
OLS, ordinary least squares, AE, Adult equivalent;*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively; a Reference group is traditional channel farmers. b Reference year is 2012.      c Reference 




Table A3. 2 Supermarket contracting and dietary outcomes  
  Calorie (Kcal/day/AE) HDDS 1 Zinc (mg/day/AE) Iron (mg/day/AE) Vitamin A (Ug/day/AE) 
Variables RE OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE OLS 
SM participation (dummy)a 264.67** 272.51** 0.18* 0.24** 1.84** 2.14*** 0.50 0.55 -22.95 -12.72 
 
(113.07) (115.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.80) (0.79) (0.85) (0.87) (83.26) (80.00) 
Year 2015 (dummy) b -312.91** -328.99** -1.75*** -1.78*** -6.71*** -7.07*** 1.59 0.80 -200.52** -240.57** 
 
(123.43) (127.55) (0.10) (0.11) (0.79) (0.82) (0.97) (0.95) (94.08) (96.93) 
Male household head (dummy) -138.55 -138.92 0.05 0.03 -4.49*** -4.55*** 1.69* 1.74* -225.46** -228.85** 
 
(133.46) (133.74) (0.13) (0.13) (1.14) (1.07) (0.93) (0.94) (112.61) (115.10) 
Education of household head (years) -13.37 -13.44 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 14.71* 15.57* 
 
(12.34) (12.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (8.77) (8.21) 
Off-farm income (1000 Ksh) -49.44 -50.03 -0.19** -0.16* -0.29 -0.47 -0.27 -0.19 -47.71 -58.02 
 
(91.06) (91.88) (0.08) (0.09) (0.57) (0.58) (0.75) (0.72) (73.91) (73.61) 
Farm land owned (acres) 50.86** 52.12*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.21* 0.23* 0.25* 0.25* 33.30** 33.02** 
 
(20.00) (20.15) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (13.63) (13.60) 
Household size (AE) -459.66*** -473.38*** -0.09 -0.12 -3.39*** -3.79*** -2.34*** -3.10*** -272.48*** -308.10*** 
 
(80.95) (83.22) (0.07) (0.07) (0.54) (0.56) (0.61) (0.58) (54.38) (54.80) 
Kikuyu region (dummy) c -144.01 -141.77 0.09 0.10 -0.53 -0.46 0.30 0.38 175.31** 180.04** 
 
(92.03) (88.41) (0.09) (0.08) (0.63) (0.58) (0.75) (0.67) (79.20) (75.16) 
Githunguri region (dummy) c -94.01 -96.47 -0.11 -0.12 -1.02 -0.98 0.87 0.79 0.64 8.01 
 
(161.05) (147.17) (0.16) (0.15) (1.06) (0.96) (1.27) (1.25) (116.66) (108.31) 
Westlands region (dummy) c -691.04*** -693.76*** 0.36 0.31 -4.24*** -4.32*** -3.88*** -3.81** 19.71 12.07 
 
(211.11) (203.58) (0.24) (0.21) (1.37) (1.22) (1.40) (1.62) (139.04) (143.16) 
Constant 5225.74*** 5289.41*** 9.22*** 12.83*** 32.50*** 47.59*** 19.80*** 19.83*** 2389.01*** 2554.32*** 
 
(451.19) (477.48) (0.22) (0.40) (1.77) (3.11) (1.74) (3.34) (340.50) (353.86) 
Wald chi2 (10) 68.29*** 
 



























Notes: Observations=784; Robust standard errors in parentheses; SM, supermarket; RE, Random effects; OLS, ordinary least squares, AE, Adult equivalent. 





Table A3. 3 Fixed effects models for dietary outcomes 
 
VARIABLES Calorie(kcal/day/AE) HDDS 1 HDDS 2 Zinc(mg/day/AE) Iron (mg/day/AE) Vitamin A (Ug/day/AE) 
SM participation (dummy)a 72.30 -0.14 0.04 0.17 -0.48 -153.00 
 
(185.30) (0.17) (0.13) (1.31) (1.24) (182.97) 
Year 2015 (dummy) b -160.57 -1.63*** -0.88*** -5.22*** 4.11*** 27.33 
 
(174.33) (0.14) (0.12) (1.10) (1.45) (128.56) 
Male household head (dummy) -103.19 0.42 0.49** -2.42 2.85 123.96 
 
(358.84) (0.27) (0.21) (2.50) (2.45) (166.99) 
Education level of farmer (years) - - - - - - 
Off-farm income (dummy) -53.28 -0.29** -0.22** 0.01 -0.45 -29.67 
 
(128.81) (0.12) (0.10) (0.76) (1.01) (101.45) 
Farm size (acres) -2.53 0.01 0.01 -0.13 0.001 -1.97 
 
(76.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.40) (0.45) (51.19) 
Household size (AE) -318.79** 0.01 -0.07 -1.82** 0.10 -69.77 
 
(128.8) (0.11) (0.09) (0.79) (1.04) (88.79) 
Kikuyu region (dummy) c - - - - - - 
       Githunguri region (dummy) c - - - - - - 
       Westlands region (dummy) c - - - - - - 
       Constant 4462.86*** 12.69*** 9.20*** 38.38*** 6.25 1430.76*** 
 
(759.30) (0.64) (0.52) (5.02) (6.17) (529.10) 
Number of observations 784 784 784 784 784 784 
R-squared 0.04 0.63 0.39 0.13 0.13 0.01 
Hausman (chi-square statistic) 4.40 9.47 6.45 4.37 2.33 4.75 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; SM, supermarket; AE, Adult equivalent; mg, milligram; * , **,*** significance at the  10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively; . 




4 General Conclusion 
We set out to first analyze smallholder farmers’ preferences for contracts and design attributes 
before examining the effects of their participation in supermarket channels on household 
income and diets. The two objectives were achieved as elucidated in the two preceding 
chapters of this dissertation. Contract configuration, among other factors, is an integral 
determinant of smallholder participation in marketing contracts and particularly supermarket 
contracts if it balances marketing risks between the parties. Smallholder participation in such 
high-value markets has positive and significant effects on farm households’ welfare in terms 
of income and nutrition. Hence, depending on the context and the nature of the agricultural 
products, contract farming remains a promising pathway towards linking smallholder farmers 
to markets and improving their welfare as seen in the example of supermarket contracts.   
 
4.1 Main Findings 
From the panel data, high drop-out rates from supermarket channels are observed between 
2008 and 2015. Our study was motivated by the need to understand why this is the case, 
which partially pointed to issues of contract design among other constraints. We also analyzed 
the effects of supplying supermarkets on household income and diets, the latter having 
received little attention in the existing literature on supermarkets. The key findings are 
summarized as follows. 
The findings in chapter 2 of this dissertation stem from a choice experiment to analyze 
farmers’ preferences and preference heterogeneity for supermarket contracts in Kenya. 
Various specifications of mixed logit models were employed and results show that farmers 
without previous contract experience have more negative attitudes towards contracts in 
general. Some socioeconomic characteristics of the farmers influence preferences for 
contracts and design attributes such as gender and age, income, and education. Several other 
studies have documented such socioeconomic factors to also be significant drivers of farm 
production, productivity, and marketing capacity.  
The contractual features associated with high transaction costs and risks impede farmers’ 
willingness to contract especially among the locationally disadvantaged from remote areas 





the marketing challenges. This is closely related to the most problematic contract attribute, 
payment mode. While delayed payment is very common in such contracts, farmers have more 
negative attitude towards contracts with delayed payments based on quantities that 
supermarkets finally sell to customers because all the marketing risks are then transferred to 
farmers. Farmers’ willingness to accept output prices triple when contract clauses involve 
payments for unverifiable quantities sold to customers. 
Chapter 3 provides the main findings from panel data analysis of the effects of supermarket 
contracting on household income and diets using fixed effects and random effects estimators. 
We find that supermarket contracting is associated with positive and significant increase in 
household income and diets. Specifically, supplying supermarkets has increased farm 
household income by 66% and improves dietary diversity, consumption of calories and zinc. 
Increased incomes improve farm households’ economic access to diverse and nutritious foods 
that improve dietary diversity, calories, and micronutrient consumption especially if food 
markets are well functioning. 
These findings illuminate the key issues on contract design and farmers’ preferences, and 
subsequent welfare implications of supermarket contracting. This is important when 
examining the pathways to link smallholder farmers to high-value markets through contracts, 
a balance between viability and competing interests of farmers and buyers.  
 
4.2 Policy Implications 
From a development perspective, our empirical results have some important policy 
implications, given the significant role that small farm sector plays in enhancing economic 
growth in many developing countries. Contract configuration influences farmers’ preferences 
for contracts, particularly supermarket contracts. Supermarket contracts that balance risks 
between parties may facilitate smallholder access to supermarket channels, which could have 
positive and significant effects on farm households’ welfare. For example, supermarket 
contracts potentially increase investment in productive assets that facilitate increased crop 
production. Depending on the types of crops produced, this can increase food production thus 
availability of food within farm households. Growth in farm profits also increase household 
income that could significantly reduce rural poverty given that majority of the rural 
households are smallholder farmers. Overall, improved financial status of contracted farm 





safe, and nutritious foods. This could significantly ameliorate the high prevalence of 
undernutrition and micronutrients malnutrition as shown in the analysis. 
Linking smallholders to high-value markets would therefore be beneficial to the development 
and growth of the agricultural sector in developing countries. Such developments also lead to 
positive spillovers such as farm and off-farm employment of laborers within the emerging 
value chains and reduced rural-urban migration. Given the findings, the onus is on the 
Government agencies and other stakeholders in the value chains to strike a balance in the 
interventions to increase smallholder participation in high-value channels such as 
supermarkets. Specifically, findings on preferences for contracts highlight the need for 
regulatory frameworks to govern contracts by balancing risks, ensuring accountability and 
transparency in quality grading of farm produce and price formation mechanisms. This could 
create opportunities for gainful smallholder farming and market access as well as stability of 
such high-value chains. 
A few constraints to smallholder participation in supermarket contracts are mentioned in this 
dissertation and are captured by the various contract design attributes discussed. Further, 
certain socioeconomic and demographic characteristics emerge as drivers of supermarket 
contracting. Leveraging gains from supermarket contracting and its modalities is key to 
enhancing smallholder inclusion in high-value markets. In particular, group marketing comes 
out as important in ensuring consistent supplies to supermarkets from smallholders who 
otherwise would not aggregate required volumes.  
Performance of farmer organizations in most developing countries is ineffective as observed 
in many studies.  Interventions that strengthen operations of farmer organizations or interest 
groups involved in collective marketing are beneficial as they are conduits for technology 
transfer and market information exchanges thus reducing transaction and transportation costs 
incurred by smallholders. Vegetable farmers in the study areas also mentioned unreliable and 
high costs of transportation, long distances to markets and poor roads as marketing 
impediments during the focus group discussions. Hence, infrastructural upgrades are 
beneficial in reducing transportation time and costs while preserving quality of produce in the 







Scaling up smallholder participation in high-value channels characterized by contracts is not a 
panacea for smallholder marginalization from high-value markets, rural poverty, 
undernourishment and micronutrient malnutrition. Concerted multi-pronged efforts are 
necessary to make smallholder inclusion in such channels consistent and profitable. This 
would require not only output market interventions but also input markets to facilitate 
smallholder farmers’ access to appropriate technologies for production (including genuine 
quality seeds and crop chemicals) and regulatory frameworks for sustainable production, 
access and use of arable land.  
Supermarket contracting has had positive significant effects on farm households’ welfare up 
till now. However, some studies also show that economic gains from supplying supermarkets 
erode when farmers drop-out. This means that improvement in nutritional status of 
households could also deteriorate when the farmers revert to traditional channels. With the 
dynamic food-marketing environment, an optimistic view would be that the positive effects of 
supermarket contracting persist over time. In this regard, more follow-up studies with larger 
sample of farmers are required to analyze longer-term effects of supplying supermarkets. This 
remains an active area of research and the conclusions in the event of such undertakings are 
wide open. 
 
4.3 Study Limitations and Future Research 
We analyzed farmers’ preferences for supermarket contracts and the effects of supermarket 
contracting on farm households’ income and nutrition. However, agricultural markets in most 
developing countries are imperfect and global agri-food systems are rapidly transforming with 
significant implications for both domestic and agricultural export markets. This dynamism 
requires continuous assessment of the evolving contracts and implications on smallholder 
welfare. We used a few selected attributes for the choice experiment that may not 
conclusively surmise the dynamic contractual environment but nonetheless capture key 
contract attributes that largely influence farmers’ willingness to contract and tradeoffs 
between them. Future studies could incorporate other additional attributes that possibly 






We acknowledge the following computational challenges of estimating dietary outcomes in 
our study particularly in estimating the daily intakes of energy (calories) and micronutrients. 
In the estimations, we use random effects estimator therefore possible endogeneity issues such 
as sample selection bias still remain. This is occasioned by limited within group variations 
given only two rounds of data are available. Besides, we do not believe there are any time 
variant unobserved characteristics of the farmers that would affect our result in such a short 
time period. Nonetheless, more rounds of data would yield robust estimates.  
It should be noted that the daily consumption estimates and dietary diversity score are only 
measures of food availability and not actual quantities eaten. Hence, not perfect measures of 
household food security or nutrition for the following reasons. First, food wastes, gifts and 
usage for other purposes are not fully accounted for. Second, we did not capture the 
composition of the diets and therefore assumed bioavailability thresholds mentioned. Lastly, 
7-day recall data used do not account for intra-household food distribution that affects 
nutrition status of household members. There may also be seasonal variations in consumption 
that could not be accounted for. Such could be made possible with more frequent surveys. 
Nonetheless, these drawbacks affect all the groups of farmers in a similar way so that there 
should be no systematic bias in estimates.  
Household dietary diversity score has been criticized as an inadequate measure of dietary 
quality. In our study, we excluded certain food groups as also done in similar studies in order 
to capture the quality component of access to food. Future studies could explore other 
measures of dietary quality such as women or individual dietary diversity score that focus on 
adequacy of micronutrients in the diet. Twenty-four hours recall data collected at individual 
level would also be more precise to assess further details of dietary quality. 
Like many other studies, our study focused on a limited geographical coverage that also limits 
wider interpretation of results. Future studies could use nationally representative samples to 
analyze broader impacts of contract farming in diverse contexts. With larger samples, it is 
easier to analyze heterogeneous effects of supermarket contracting. It could also be interesting 
to analyze the longer-term spillover effects of supermarket contracting to other farm 
enterprises, especially for supermarket channel drop-outs and farmers that are unable to join 
the channel but potentially benefit from technology transfer and marketing information from 
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Household Questionnaire  
 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 2015 
 UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN 
FOLLOW UP SURVEY ON ACCESS TO HIGH-VALUE AGRICULTURAL MARKETS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF VEGETABLE PRODUCTION IN 
CENTRAL KENYA. 
 
“We are students from Gottingen University-Germany, who are studying different aspects of agricultural development. We 
are currently doing a follow up survey on the study first conducted by James Rao in 2008 and continued by Christine Chege 
and Camilla Anderson in 2012 about vegetable production in Kiambu area. The main purpose of this study is to understand 
more about farmers’ decisions about production and marketing of vegetables. Your participation in answering these questions 
is very much appreciated. Your responses will be COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL and will only be used for research 
purpose. Your responses will be added to those of 402 other households and analyzed together. If you indicate your voluntary 
consent by participating in this interview, may we begin? 
 
Household No:   HHID  ______________ 
                                                                       Survey Date: (dd/mm/yyyy)   SURDATE    __
 __/____/ 2015 
     Start time (24 Hrs)  STIME ______:_____ 
 
HH head Name (Full name)        __________________________________ 
 
Respondent’s name (Full name) __________________________________ MEMID________ 
 
Cell phone number   _____________________________________ 
 
(Enumerator Instruction:  Record the member number (MEMID) of the Respondent from the Demography 
table on page 29 after the survey is completed.) 
 
Identifying Variables: 
Supervisor:  ____________________________  SNUM __________         
Enumerator:  ____________________________  ENUM __________     
District:  ____________________________  DIST ___________   
Division:  ____________________________  DIV ___________    
Location:   _______________________________ LOC ____________   
Sub-Location:  ____________________________  SUBLOC _________    
Village:   ____________________________  VIL ____________ 
Supplier to HVC? (0=No;1=Yes directly;2=Indirectly) HVCSUPLR in 2008 ____ / 2012 ____ 
Split of Household HHID:  ______________ Replacement Household:   
(0 if not; HHID of original HH if Yes)    Household moved   
GPS Coordinats (homestead):  GPS No : _______       Waypoint No : 
___________ 
     (1=North; 
2=South)  
   
  
 EAST=1   
 
          ELEVATION (M.A.S.L) 
 
Data entry clerk Name: _____________________________ DECODE__________ 
  
 
 2      .           
          
1    .      
          
      METRES 
Questionnaire number (HHID) ____________________ 
74 
 
1.0 SECTION 1: GENERAL FARMING INFORMATION  
1.1 In total, what is the size of the land holding (area owned) by this household? 
a) Size _______ b) Unit _________ (1= acres, 2= m2, 3=Ha, 4=feet2) 
1.2 For how long have you been farming (as an independent household)?  
a) Years: _______ b) Months: _______  
1.3 What was the size of the farm when you started cultivating it?   
a) Size:  __________  
b) Unit: ___________ (1= acres, 2= m2, 3=Ha, , 4=feet2) 
1.4 In the current season (March-August 2015), what crops do you grow on your farm and what 
size of your farm is allocated to each crop grown? 
  Responsible  Total area under crop Area owned Area leased in 
Crop 
code 
Crop name MEMID of 
primarily 
responsible 
for this crop 
Area Unit  
(Unit  
Codes )a 
Area (use the 
same unit code 
as for total area 
under crop) 
Area (use the 
unit code for 
as for total 
area under 
crop) 
1 All Vegetables b      
2 Potatoes (Irish)      
3 Sweet potatoes      
4 Maize      
5 Beans       
6 Yams      
7 Tea      
8 Coffee      
9 Bananas      
10 Fodder      
11 Other (Specify1____________)      
12 Other (Specify2____________)      
13 Other (Specify3____________)      
14 Other (Specify4____________)      
15 Other (Specify5____________)      
  
 Total area leased out      
  a UNIT CODE: 1= acres, 2= m2, 3=Ha, , 4=feet2 





1.5 Do you use irrigation on your farm? ______ (Yes =1; No =0) (If No, Go to Q1.9) 
1.6 If yes, how long have you been using irrigation? Years: ______ Months: _______  
1.7 For the current season (March-August 2015), what size of your total cultivated area is irrigated?  
a) Size:  __________  b) Unit: ____________ (1= acres, 2= m2, 3=Ha,, 4=feet2 ) 
1.8 If you irrigate part/whole of your farm, what special irrigation equipment do you have?  
Irrigation equipment/tool 1=YES; 0=NO 
1) Water pump  
2) Borehole  
3) Well  
4) Dam  
5) Water tank  
6) Drip irrigation system  
7) Special pipes  
8) Sprinkler  
9) Watering can  
10) Other (please specify) ________________  
1.9 What is the value of all vegetables sold and consumed from the farm for the LAST crop year 
(2014/2015)? (Please make sure that sales and consumption from the FULL year is included) 
Rainy season  
(March-May 2014 and  Nov-Dec 2014) 
Dry season   
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2=5 Kg bag 
3=25 Kg 
bag 
4=50 kg bag 
5=90 kg bag 
6=Debe (18 kgs) 
7=Number/Unit 
8=Gorogoro (2.25 
kg tin)  
9=1/4 kg tin 













Short rains season  (September 2014-January 2015)                      
Crop 
code 
Crop name Quantity 
produced 


























































2 Potatoes (Irish)                
3 Sweet potatoes                
4 Dry Maize                
11 Green Maize                
5 Beans                 
6 Yams                
12 Other (Specify1 
____________) 
               
13 Other (Specify2 
____________) 
               
Last farming  year (from February 2014-January 2015) 
7 Tea         
8 Coffee         
9 Bananas         
10 Fodder         
14 Other (Specify3 
____________) 
        
Questionnaire number (HHID) ____________________ 
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1.11 For each crop mentioned above please give details of the cost of production for the crop year 2014/2015. Details should be for all plots and the two crop 











Seeds Fertilizer Manure Pesticide 









































1 All Vegetables               
2 Potatoes (Irish)               
3 Sweet potatoes               
4 Maize               
5 Beans               
6 Yams               
7 Tea               
8 Coffee               















              
15 Other 
(specify4_______) 
              
a Cost of total land rent for the whole year for each of the crop on rented land  c If farmer used own manure, ask for the local value of the manure   d If the farmer owns machinery ask for local  
 rates of machinery use;  
 
 
bUNIT CODE  
1=Kilogram 
2=5 KG. BAG 
3=25 KG. BAG 
4=50 KG. BAG 
5=90 KG. BAG 
6=DEBE (18 kg) 
7=Number/Unit 
8=Gorogoro(2.25tin) 
9=1/4 kg tin 






16=2 kg Packet 
17=grams 
18=Wheelbarrow 





1.12 How many permanent farm workers did you have last year (January 2014-December 2014) 








Length of employment 
Jan-Dec 2014 (In 
months) 
Type of work (1=only crops; 
2=only livestock; 3= both) 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
6     
1.13 Besides permanent workers give the following details on labor use and cost for casual workers 
employed on your farm for crop production on a weekly basis for last year (January 2014-
December 2014).  (Including both piece rate and daily wage rate) 
Peak season ( _________ months) (To be specified by the respondent) 
























































            
























































            
 
1.14 What is the average daily wage rate for men and women in this area?                                             
Men _______ Ksh/day  Women _______ Ksh/day 





1.17  For the whole of last year (January 2014-Decemeber 2014), please give details of revenue and 
cost of livestock production?  
 






























          
Other 
cow 
          
Goat           
Sheep           
Chicken           
Donkeys           
Pigs           
Rabbits           








          
All listed 
above 
          
 
aUNIT CODE (1=litres, 2=mililitres, 3=Units/numbers,  4=Tray) 
 
2.0 SECTION 2: GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT VEGETABLES  
PLEASE FIND OUT WHO IS IN CHARGE OF VEGETABLE PRODUCTION AND INTERVIEW 
THIS PERSON.  
2.1 Who makes decision about vegetable farming and marketing?  
a) Name of decision maker ________________________________ b) MEMID________ 
(Enumerator Instruction:  Record the member number (OPMEM) of the decision maker from the Demography 
table on page 25 after the survey is completed.) 
2.2 How long have you been growing vegetables (as an independent household)? 
a) Years: _________ b) Months: __________ 
Animal product/services 1.Quantity sold 2.Units 
(UNIT CODE)a 




Milk     
Eggs     
Hide     





2.3 Since 2013, how much of the indigenous and exotic vegetables have you been growing? 
(Enumerator, ask the farmer to give the  average  area for each year, considering all seasons)   
 Area in 2015 (in acres) Area in 2014 (in acres) Area in 2013 (in acres) 
1=African indigenous 
vegetables  
   
2)= Exotic vegetables    
 (African indigenous vegetables are e.g managu, terere, kunde, osuga, pumpkin leaves etc;  
Exotic vegetables are e.g spinach, sukuma wiki, lettuce, etc)  
 
2.4 How many vegetable plots did your household have in 2014 main season (Feb. –Aug.)? _______ 
2.6 What are the three ways in which most of the money from selling vegetables was used? (1=largest 


































            
2.7 For the present season (March-August 2015), how much of your vegetable area is irrigated? 
a) Area:  __________  b) Unit: _________ (1= acres, 2= m2, 3=Ha, 4=feet2) 
2.8 From where do you get information on production of vegetables such as information on 
production techniques, new seeds, pest control, input use etc.? (Rank three most important 
sources)(1=most important source, 2=2nd most important, etc.) 
 Rank (1-3) 
1) Government extension (field days etc.)  
2) Agricultural cooperative   
3) NGO (Please specify) __________________  
4) Input dealer  
5)  Members of my farmers’ group  
6) Other farmers (e.g., neighbors, but non-group members)  
7) Public gathering (barazas)  
8) Public media (e.g., radio, newspaper, magazines)  
9) Traders  
10) Contracting retailer (supermarket, export companies, etc.)  
11)Agricultural seminars, workshops, group trainings  
12) Own experience  
13) Other (please specify):   
2.9  When it comes to obtaining new information about production of vegetables, would you say that 
it is very difficult, difficult, easy or very easy for you to obtain such information? 






2.10 What kind of production information do you feel you are lacking? 
Type of production information lacking 1=YES; 
0=NO 
1. New varieties  
2. Correct pesticide  
3. Production techniques  
4. Credit possibilities  
5. Selection of good seed  
6. Use of inorganic/ organic fertilizer  
7. Others (specify)______________________________  
 
4.0 SECTION 4: INPUT AND OUTPUT DATA FOR VEGETABLE PRODUCTION 
 The following questions relate to the present season (March-August 2015). 1. Farmers supplying 
supermarkets (direct or indirect) should give information for the main vegetables that they mostly 
supply to supermarket. 2. Farmers supplying to institutions and companies should give information on 
the main vegetables that they mostly supply to institutions and companies (unless they supply to 
supermarkets). 3. The rest of the farmers should give information about their main vegetable to the 
traditional market. 
3.26 For this season (March-August 2015), where do you sell/plan to sell your vegetables? 




1=market where highest quantity is sold/will be sold; 
2=market where 2nd highest quantity is sold/will be 
sold; 
3=market where 3rd highest quantity is sold/will be 
sold; 
  
1. The supermarkets  
2. Traders/brokers to supermarkets  
3. Companies and institutions  
              (City park market, Mogoya vegetables, 
exporting companies, hotels, green groceries) 
 
4. Independent middlemen or traders 
        (spot market, independent middlemen and 
brokers) 
 
5. Spot market  











4.1 Which are the three main vegetables that you sell/will sell in highest volume to your most 
preferred market (as noted in 4.26; please note: current season March-August 2015)? 








1) Managu  5) Kales (Sukuma 
wiki) 
 9) Brocolli   
2) Sargeti  6) Cabbage  10)Lettuce  
3) Terere  7) Spinach  11)Others:  
4) Thoroko (cow pea 
leaves) 
 8) Dhania 
(Corriander) 





Please identify up to three plots where vegetables are grown and ask the following questions at the site of these plots. Please start with the vegetable 
identified in 3.1 as most important. (I f more than one plot, please choose the plots based on the last digit of the HHID). 
 
4.2 Please give the following information starting with the plot that contains the main vegetable sold in terms of volume to the most preferred market. 
Continue with the second and third most important vegetables in terms of marketed volume. 
f Number of harvesting rounds before the plot is replanted   
 































































































Usually sold by 
(MEMID) 
(Please identify 
who is actually 


























                  
                  









1= highly fertile, 
2=medium fertile, 
3= low fertile.   
1=black cotton soil, 
2=clay soil, 
3=loam soil,  
4=sandy soil, 
5= other, specify 
_______________ 
1=steeply sloped plot, 
2= gently sloped plot, 
3=plot on flat ground.  
 











9= Dhania (Corriander) 
10= Brocolli,  







4.3 If output is measured in bags, approximately how many bundles can one make from one bag of vegetables? 
Plot 1:______ bundles   Plot 2: ______ bundles   Plot3: ______ bundles 
4.4 How many leaves/stems of this vegetable make one bundle?  
Plot1: __________leaves/stems   Plot2: __________leaves/stems Plot3: __________leaves/stems 
 




Who made the decisions about the production on 
this plot? 
(I.e.  when, where, how much and what type of 
vegetable to grow) 
Who made decisions about the output from this 
plot? 
(I.e. how much to sell, how much to use for home 
consumption where and when to sell)? 
Who decided how to use the revenues from sales 
from this plot? 
 











(Decision maker codes below)c 
 
(Decision maker codes below) c 
 
Plot1       
Plot2       
Plot3       
 
 c DECISION MAKER CODE: 
1=Husband alone made the decisions,  
2=Husband was the major decision maker after 
consulting with wife,  
3=Wife alone made the decisions,  
4=Wife was the major decision maker after 
consulting with husband 
5=Someone else makes decision ( use MEMID; 
where not applicable specify who, including 
gender and relation to Husband, e.g. daughter)  
Questionnaire number (HHID) ____________________ 
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4.5. For the first plot, please specify all inputs that you use during the entire crop cycle, their prices per 
unit, and the total amount of money spent on this plot? Please give information for one full plot 
planted at once. 
Input No. of 
times 
applied 




SOURCE CODE b 





Unit of purchase 
USE UNIT CODEa 
1. Seed        
Organic matter (specify)        
2. Own farm-yard manure        
3. Purchased farm-yard 
manure 
       
Pesticides        
4.Insecticide        
5.Fungicide        
6.Herbicide        
7. Electricity       KPLC 
8.Fuel for irrigation        
Fertilizers (Please specify)        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Other inputs(Please specify)        
        





        














9=1/4 kg tin 












 1= input dealer; 2= NGO; 
3= trader; 4= fellow 
farmers; 5 = informal 






4.7 For the first plot, please specify how often the following operations were/are carried out for one 
complete growing cycle. Please give information for one full plot planted at once. 
 
Farm activities How 
many 
times? 











How many of those are 
usually hired laborers? 
Male Female Male Female 
1. Land preparation        
2. Planting        
3. Gap filling        
4. Manual weeding         
5. Irrigating        
6. Fertilizer application        
7. Pesticide application        
8. Other chemicals        
9. Harvesting        
10. Cleaning and packing        
11.Other, specify:_______        
4.8 In general, what method of land preparation (plowing and harrowing) do you use? ______    
(0=None, 1 = Tractor 2 = Animal traction 3 = Manual/hand)  
4.9 If you use tractor or animal traction how much do you pay for this service? _________ (Ksh/acre). 
(If the farmer owns tractor or animals, what is the local rate for these services?) 
4.10 Generally, how many times in a year do you grow the vegetable on the first plot? _________ 
3 SECTION 3: INFORMATION ON MARKETING OF VEGETABLES  
3.1 Are you always able to sell all your vegetable that you wish to sell? _____ (1=YES, 0=NO) (IF YES; SKIP TO 
QN: 3.3)  




On a scale from 1 
(very small) to 5 
(very big) how big 
is the problem? 
1. The price is unbearably low   





3. I have no means of transporting   
4. Too much supply on the market (flooded market)   
5. Some of the produce is rejected by the buyer because of quality    
6. Others (Specify1) _______________________________   
7. Others (specify2) _________________________________   
3.3 Whenever you want to sell your vegetables, where do you get information on possible market 
opportunities and market prices? (Rank three most important sources) 
(Ranks: 1=most important source; 2=2nd most important source; 3=3rd most important source.) 
Source of market information Rank (1–3) 
1. From fellow farmers’ group members  
2. Other farmers, who are not members of my group  
3. From cooperative society  
4. From agricultural extension staff  
5. From NGO (Specify) _______________________  
6. From public media (radio, television, smart farmer, internet etc.)  
7. From public gatherings (chief’s baraza etc.)  
8. Agricultural seminars, workshops, group trainings  
9. From traders  
10. Others (specify)  
 
3.4 When it comes to obtaining new information about marketing opportunities and prices for 
vegetables, would you say that it is very difficult, difficult, easy or very easy for you to obtain 
such information? 
 (1 = Very difficult; 2 = Difficult; 3 = Easy; 4 = Very easy )   __________________ 
 
3.5 What kind of marketing information do you feel you are lacking? 
Type of marketing information lacking 1=Yes; 
0=No 
On a scale from 
1 (very small) to 
5 (very big) how 
big is the 
problem? 
1. Market opportunities (where to sell)   
2. Prices   
3. Market requirements or standards   






Please tell me details about marketing of vegetables produced during 2014 crop year (February 2014 
to January 2015)   
 
3.6 During last 
crop year, to 
which buyers 
did you sell your 
vegetables? 
USE THE BUYER 
CODE a 
3.7  
During which other years have 
you been selling to this buyer? 
(Enumerator: If told 2002, 2003, 
2004 and 2009 please write 2002-
2004, 2009) 
3.8 How did you 
come in contact 
with the buyer 
before you 
supplied 
him/her/it for the 
very first time? b 
USE CONTACT 
CODE b 
3.9 For the last crop year, to 
which 3 buyers did you sell 
most of your vegetables?  
Please rank them in order of 
importance 
1= buyer that bought the largest 
share 
2= buyer that bought the second 
largest share 
3= buyer that bought third largest 
share 
    
    
    
    
    
 
a BUYER CODE 
 








To supermarket via specialized 
trader/broker 
5. Trader/broker to Uchumi 
6. Trader/broker to Nakumatt 
7. Trader/broker to Tuskys 




Companies and institutions 
9.  City park market 
10. Mugoya vegetables 
11. Exporting company 
12. Hotels 
13. Green groceries 
14. School 




16. Trader that sells to 
Companies or Institutions   
 
Traditional market 
17. Spot market  
18. A specific independent  
1. Via phone through other farmers who 
supplied the buyer 
 
2. Personally when he was in the village 
through other farmers who supplied the 
buyer; 
 
3. Personally at the wholesale market 
through other farmers who supplied the 
buyer; 
 
4. Personally at the wholesale market 
without knowing the buyer; 
 
5. The buyer contacted the farmer via 
phone; 
 





 middleman or broker 
19. Various independent brokers 
or middlemen 
20. Other  
(Specify) ______________ 
 
personally when he was in the village 
 
7. Other specify_______________ 
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Please tell me more details about your 3 most important buyers (listed in 3.9): 
 
PLEASE LIST THE THREE MOST 
IMPORTANT BUYERS RANKED IN 3.9 
3.10 For the last crop 
year, when did this 
buyer mainly pay you 
for your produce? 
 
1= The same day; 
2=Within 1 week; 
3=Within 2 weeks; 
 4=At the end of the 
month 



















you made any 
specific 
investments 























        
        





3.16 Now we are interested in your reasons for selling to different buyers  
PLEASE FILL IN THE NAME OF THE BUYER 





0= if  reason is not mentioned  
If reason is mentioned: 
On a scale from 1, very small advantage of 
this buyer, to 5,very big advantage of this 
buyer, how important is this 










Buyer ranked   





Buyer ranked   
No. 3 in question 
3.9 
Why did you sell 
vegetables to 
-----------------? 
Why did you sell 
vegetables to 
-----------------? 
Why did you  
sell vegetables  
to 
------------------? 
1. The buyer offers a high price     
2. The buyer pays a stable price    
3. The buyer does not manipulate price (does not 
change price arbitrarily) 
   
4. I can negotiate price with the buyer    
5. The buyer pays promptly    
6. The buyer will always buy the produce (market 
assurance) 
   
7. The buyer is not strict on the quality of products, 
so I can sell all my produce 
   
8. I do not have to worry about breakages/spoilage 
after selling 
   
9. We have a long standing trading relationship    
10. The buyer  is well known in the village    
11. We are friends or relatives    
12. Welfare or financial support, e.g. advance 
payment 
   
13. The buyer provide me with knowledge about 
production methods  
   
14. I have no other alternative market (buyer)    
15. I cannot supply more to other buyers that I would 
rather sell to 
   
16. I have no means of transporting vegetables to 
other markets 
   
17. Other reasons (specify) 
_______________________ 






IF THE RESPONDENT SOLD AT LEAST SOME VEGETABLES TO SUPERMARKETS DURING 
THE LAST CROP YEAR: PLEASE GO TO QUESTION 3.21 
3.17 Do you know that you can sell vegetables to supermarkets?  _____________ 
 
(1=YES; 0=NO-> go to question 3.22) 
3.18 Why did you not supply your vegetables to supermarkets?  
Reasons:  
PLEASE FILL IN 
1 = if reason is mentioned 
0= if  reason is not 
mentioned 
     
 
PLEASE  FILL IN 
On a scale from 1 to 5 how 
big is the problem? (Where 
1 is very small and 5 very 
big) 
   
1. Do not pay promptly   
2. Cheats on the timing of payment   
3. Too much variation in prices   
4. Cheats on price agreement   
5. Offers low price   
   
6. Demand too strict standards   
7. Rejects too much of my produce   
8. Cheats on quality agreement    
   
9. Farmer is unable to supply required 
quantity consistently 
  
10. Buys too small quantities   
11. Too much damages/breakages   
12. Cheating on damage/breakages   
   
13. Difficult to get the initial contract   
14. Require reliable means of transport   
15. Time consuming / labor demanding   
16. Capital intensive   
17. Others (specify 1) 
________________________ 
  




3.19 Have you ever supplied to supermarkets? _________________ (1=YES; 0=NO) IF NO SKIP TO 3.21 
 
3.20 If yes, during which years? 2012 ___ 2013 ____ 2014 _____ 2015____ (Enumerator: Please make 
sure that all years are included; “1” if farmer supplied and “0” if not ) 
 





3.22 When selling your vegetables to______ (buyer ranked one, supermarket or companies and institutions), 
when do you agree on…? 
PLEASE FILL IN THE NAME OF THE BUYER 




1=agreement on spot  
2 = agreement before supply,  
3= agreement before production,  











FILL IN ONLY 
IF farmer 
supplied to any 
supermarket but  







FILL IN ONLY 
IF farmer 
supplied to any 
company or 
institution but 
not ranked it 
No. 1 
Agreement on transaction (Transaction attributes) 
1. On type of vegetable    
2. On price    
3. On quantity    
4. To supply continuously (all year round)    
5. To deliver regularly (twice/week etc.)    
6. On production technique    
7. Mode of payment (e.g. cash/cheque/m-pesa)    
8. Specific plot to be used for production    
9. I should have a cell phone for receiving orders    
10. No side-selling    
11. Time of delivery    
12. Time of payment    
13. Other ( specify ______________    
Agreement of product attributes 
1. Vegetable should be harvested at certain age    
2. Deliver fresh produce (delivered within hours 
of harvesting) 
   
3. Vegetable should be cleaned before delivery     
4. Vegetable  should be free from pests    
5. Vegetable should be packed in certain quantity 
and ready for shelf 
   
6. Minimum pesticide use    





3.23  Please give more details of the agreement and rejection rates (to be asked for all buyers except 
Spot market) 
PLEASE FILL IN THE NAME OF THE BUYERS 






No. 1 in question 
3.9 
 





FILL IN ONLY 
IF farmer 
supplied to any 
supermarket but  



















1. If there was an agreement, was it oral or written? 
 
1= Oral, 2=Written 3=Partly oral and partly written 
   
2. If there was an agreement, what would have happened 
if you were unable to fulfill the agreement?  
 
USE THE CONSEQUENCE CODE a (multiple codes 
possible) 
         
3. If there was an agreement, how many times during 
last season were you unable to deliver upon request?   
 
IN NUMBER OF TIMES 
   
In general….    
4. During last season, how much of your product 
was rejected? 
IN PERCENT 
   
5. Did you agree on the rejection? 
1= YES; 0=NO 
   
6. How often has the buyer been to your farm in the 
last one year?  
 
(1= Never;    2= Once;     3= More than once) 
   
a CONSEQUENCE CODE 
1 = Nothing happens  
2 = I will immediately lose the opportunity to supply to the 
buyer  
5 = I will have to pay back next season  
6 = It will be pressure from the buyer  





3.24 Did you receive any other services or assistance from the buyers of your vegetables? 
PLEASE FILL IN THE NAME OF THE BUYERS 
BASED ON QUESTION 3.9 
 
0 = if  service/assistance is not mentioned 
If reason is mentioned: 
On a scale from 1, very small, to 5, very big, 













FILL IN ONLY 
IF farmer 
supplied to any 
supermarket 
but  not ranked 
it No.1 




FILL IN ONLY 
IF farmer 
supplied to any 
company or 
institution but not 
ranked it No. 1 
                     
I received service or assistance on; 
   
1. Seeds supply     
2. Pesticide supply    
3. Fertilizer supply    
4. Information on production techniques 
(extension) 
   
5. Credit on output (welfare support)    
6. Loan guarantee    
7. Advances on crop production    
8. Market information (output)    
9. Market information (input)    
10. Harvest    
11. Transportation to market    
12. Other assistance (specify______________    
 
3 = I will eventually lose the opportunity to supply to the buyer  






3.25 Please list any problems or complaints/ dissatisfaction that you have about the top ranked buyers of 
vegetables in question 3.9? (Please rank your complaints/problems). 
PLEASE FILL IN THE NAME OF THE BUYERS 
ACCORING TO THE RANKING IN QUESTION 
3.9   
 
0 = if reason is not mentioned 
If reason is mentioned: 
On a scale from 1, very small, to 5, very big, 











FILL IN ONLY 
IF farmer 
supplied to any 
supermarket but  














ranked it No. 
1 
Problem  
1. Cheating on price agreement    
2. Cheating on quality agreement      
3. Cheating on time of  buying    
4. Cheating on the timing of payment    
5. Offers low price    
6. Cheating on damage/breakages    
7. Others (specify1) 
________________________ 
   
8. Others (specify2) 
________________________ 







5.0  SECTION 5: INFORMATION ON CREDIT ACCESS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS 
5.1 Could you obtain credit if you need it for the purpose of operational expenses (e.g. buying 
fertilizer, paying for labor etc.)? _________1=YES, 0=NO 
5.2 Could you obtain credit if you needed for the purpose of buying production assets (e.g. irrigation 
infrastructure)? _________1=YES, 0=NO 
5.3 During the last 12 months, have you or any other household member received any credit to buy 
inputs, or received inputs on credit, for production of vegetables?______1=YES, 0=NO 
5.4 If yes, what were the sources and how much did you receive? (Include the value of inputs if inputs 
are provided on credit) 
Source Number of times 
loan received 
Total amount (Ksh) Person that received 
loan (MEMID) 
1. Input dealer    
2. NGO.    
3. Bank/cooperative society.    
4. Friends/relatives    
5.  Moneylender.    
6.  Other (specify)_________    
 
5.5 Are you or any other household member currently a member of any group or association? 
___________  (1=YES; 0=NO)  (If no please go to question 5.8) 
5.6 If yes what type of group do you/ household members belong to?  




How long have you 




1. Producer group    
2. Farmers’ cooperative society    
3. SACCO    
4. Women group    
5. Youth group    
6. Community welfare group    





5.7 What type of benefits/services do you receive from your group(s)? 
Benefits/Service 1=YES; 0=NO On a scale from 1 to 
5 how big is the 
help? 
(Where 1 is very 
small and 5 very 
big) 
1. Credit service   
2. Input access   
3. Training on crop production    
4. Training on marketing   
5. Marketing of farm produce   
6.  Welfare/social support   
7.  Other (specify):   
 
5.8 Are you currently participating in AFMA/FC  marketing activities?    (1=Yes; 0= No) 
_________ 
5.8.1 Since 2012, did you ever participate in any organized marketing activities?    (1=Yes; 0= No) 
_________ (If yes, mention_________________________________) 
 
5.9 In the last 5 years, have you participated in “crop marketing days” organized by the district 






6 SECTION 6: GENERAL HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 









Name of the HH member 
3 
Relationship 
to HH head 






























































1            
 
2             
3             
4             
5             
6             
7             
8             
9             
10             
11             














8=Step children   







12 = House girl                                                       
13 =Farm laborers 
14 =Other Unrelated  
15= Other relative   
 
b Marital status   
1= Married   
2= Single 
3= Divorced/separated 
4= Widow/widower   
0= None 
1= Paid employment (civil servant, 
working in private company etc) 
2= Self-employed outside farm 
3= Working on household farm 
4= Wage labor (working on other peoples 
farms)      
5= Off-farm employment 
6=Student       
7= Other (Specify)______   
d Religion     
1=Catholic           2=Protestant 
3=Muslim            4=Traditionalist 
5=No religion      6=Others (specify) 
__________________ 













6.2 Kindly tell us the religion and tribe of the household head, spouse of the household head and the 
respondent (in case the respondent is not head or spouse to head) 
MEMID (from 
demog table 
 Tribe (Use 




 Household head   
 Spouse to household head   




6.3 What was your household’s income from the following sources during the past 12 months? (include the 
income of all household members listed in the table on page 29 exclude income already listed in the table 
on page 29) 
Income source Total 








1 Income from hiring out machinery services to other farmers (ploughing etc.)   
2 Income from own non-agricultural businesses    
3 Pensions   
4 Remittances from family members/friends who do not live in the household   
5 Revenues from leasing out land   
6 Dividends (from shares, stocks, treasury bills etc.; not from coffee and tea)   










7 SECTION 7: HOUSEHOLD ACCESS TO SOCIOECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE  
7.1 Please indicate whether the following facilities are available in the village and answer whether or 
not you have access to them.. 
 


















used means of 
transportation 
















1. Electricity    
(KPLC)                   
      
2. Piped water system                             
3. Bank                                    
4. Tarmac road                          
5. Matatu stage       
6. Public Transport 
system             
      
7. Agric. extension 
agent   
      
8. Agricultural input 
market                            
      
9. Agric. product 
market                             
      
10. Health center       
11. Supermarket retail 
outlet 
      
12. Local shopping 
center 
      
13. Nearest supermarket 
that buys fresh fruits 
and vegetables from 
farmers? 
      
14. Nearest wet market 
(example: 
Muthurua) 
      
15. Nearest place where 
you can sell 
vegetables? 
      
16. Nearest farmer that 
owns means of 
transportation for 
vegetables 
      
a Means of transport Codes 








8 SECTION 8: HOUSEHOLD ASSETS (Prompt for each item as listed below) 
8.1 At present, how many/much of the following does this household own that are in usable/repairable 





























































MEMID MEMID/ MEMID  
1 Tractor        
2 Car/Van        
3 Pickup        
4 Trailer        
5 Motorcycle        
6 Bicycle        
7 Television        
8 Radio        
9 Mobile Phone        
1
0 
Refrigerator        
1
1 
Solar panels        
1
2 Generator 
       
1
3 Oxen 
       
1
4 Chaf cutter 
       
1
5 




Animal traction plough        
1
7 





       
1
9 
Water pump        
2
0 
Borehole        
2
1 
Well        
2
2 







Drip irrigation system        
2
4 
Irrigation pipes        
2
5 
Sprinkler        
2
6 





       
2
8 
Greenhouse        
2
9 
Biogas digesters        
3
0 






8.2 How is land ownership divided over your household? 







(1= acres, 2= m2, 
3=Ha,, 4=feet2 ) 
d) 




Can this person 
decide to sell this 
land? 
(1 if “Yes”; 0 if “No”; 
If “No” go to f)) 
f) 
Who can decide to 
sell this land? 
(MEMID or specify) 
1)       
2)       
3)       
 
9 SECTION 9: SHOCKS 
9.1 Over the past three years, was your household negatively affected by any of the following events or 
developments? Please rank the 3 most severe problems experienced. 
 PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING 
QUESTIONS ACCORDINGLY 
 































1 Drought     
2 Too much rain or flood     
3 Erosion and gully formation     
4 Frosts or hailstorm     
5 Pests or diseases that affected crops before they 
were harvested 
    
6 Pests or diseases that led to storage losses     
7 Theft of crops     
8 Loss of livestock (death, theft, illness)      
9 Fire     
10 Death of male household head     
11 Death of female  household head     
12 Death of other person     














10 SECTION 10: CHARACTERISTICS OF MAIN HOUSE 
 
(ENUMERATOR: PLEASE OBSERVE AND ASK ABOUT THE FOLLOWING) 
10.1 What is the roofing material of the main house?   ROOF  _________ 
 (1=grass /makuti        2=iron sheet      3=tiles        4=other, specify__________) 
10.2 What is the wall material of the main house?   WALL  _________ 
 (1=mud    2=bricks/stones  3=iron sheet    4=wood    5=plastered    6=other, specify__________) 
10.3 What is the floor material of the main house?   FLOOR  _________ 
 (1= earth        2=cement        3=wood       4=tiles         5=other, specify__________) 
10.4 What is the mode of ownership of the main house?    HSEOWN  _________ 
  
 (1= owned        2= rented        3= owned by relative        4=other, specify__________) 
10.5 What type of toilet do you use?   TOILET  _________ 
   
(1= pit latrine         2= bush        3= flush toilet        4= other, specify__________) 
10.6 What is the main source of water for domestic use during the wet-season? 
          MAINWET  _________ 
        Distance (minutes walking)  _________
  
 (1=Pond      2=dam /sanddam      3=lake      4=stream/river        5=unprotected spring       6=protected spring    
7=well          8=borehole   9=piped into compound        10=piped outside compound        11=water tankers    12=roof 
catchments        13=waterhawkers-cart /bodaboda        14= other, specify___________) 
10.7 What is the main source of water for domestic use during the dry-season?   
         MAINDRY  _________ 
       Distance (minutes walking) _________
  
14 Illness of female household head     
15 Illness of other person     
16 Loss of regular job of a household member     
17 Divorce or abandonment of household head by 
partner 
    
18 Family member left for other reasons     
19 Other 
(specify______________________________) 






(1=Pond      2=dam /sanddam      3=lake      4=stream/river      5=unprotected spring      6=protected spring      
7=well          8=borehole    9=piped into compound        10=piped outside compound        11=water tankers        
12=roof catchments        13=waterhawkers-cart /bodaboda        14= other, specify___________)  
10.8 What is your main cooking fuel?    COOKFUEL _________ 
  
(1=electricity        2=paraffin        3=firewood        4=gas        5=charcoal        6=solar power        7=other, 
specify____________) 
10.9 What is your main source of lighting?   LITFUEL _________ 
  
(1=electricity        2=pressure lamp        3=tin lamp        4=fuel wood        5=lantern         6=solar power        






11.  SECTION 11: HOUSEHOLD NUTRITION KNOWLEDGE AND AWARENESS 
11.1 Has any member of this household ever been trained /received any information on the nutritive benefits of 
consuming different type foods? (1=Yes; 0=No) NTRAIN_____ 
11.2 If yes, what were they trained on/ got information on? 




11.3 What was the source of the training/information? 
      1= From a radio 
program 
      2= From a TV program 
      3=Church 
    4= Local leader 
    5=School 
    6=From Hospital 
7= From a neighbor 
8= From my group members 
9=From supermarket representative 
10=Others  (specify)___________________ 
 TSOURCE1_____  TSOURCE2_____  TSOURCE3_____  TSOURCE4___ 
 
12. SECTION 12: HOUSEHOLD FOOD CONSUMPTION IN THE LAST 7 DAYS (Enumerators: 
Please ask the following questions to the person who is mainly responsible for preparing food) 
12.1  In the past seven days indicate how much of the following food items your household consumed and the 
prices in Kshs (This is for all food consumed in the household, including own-produced, bought, gifts 
and from food aid program, by all the people listed on demographic table on page 29 before. INCLUDE 






Food Items consumed in the 
past 7 DAYS 
How much in 










Total value of 
consumption 
in Kshs      
Food Items consumed in 
the past 7 DAYS 
How much in 










Total value of 
consumption in 
Kshs     
 Staple foods        Vegetables    1 Cassava Tuber       30 Okra    
2 Cassava flour       31 Tomato    
3 Cassava chips       32 Pepper    
4 Yam Tuber       33 Onion    5 Yam flour       34 Carrot 
   6 Yam chips       35 Egg plant (biringanya)    7 Orangefleshed sweet potato       36 Cabbage    8 Other sweetpotato       37 Cucumber    9 Sweet potato chips       38 Pumpkin    10 Irish potato       39 Butternut    11 Irish potato chips       40 Spinach    
12 Arrowroots       41 Kales (Sukuma wiki)    13 Maize green       42 Amarantha leaves (terere) 
(Terere/Mchicha/Dodo) 
   14 Maize grain       43 Pumpkin leaves    15 Maize flour       44 Sweet potato leaves    16 Sorghum grain       45 Black night shade 
(managu/suga) 
(managu(Managu/ Osuga|) 
   17 Sorghum Flour       46 Cow pea leaves  
(((((((rr(th(Kunde/Thoroko) 
   18 Millet grain       47 Stinging nettle (thabai)    19 Millet flour        Other vegetables (specify)    20 Brown rice       48      21 White rice       49      22 Wheat grain       50      23 Wheat flour brown             24 Wheat flour white        Nuts and Pulses    25 Cooking banana       51 Beans dry    
 Other staple foods       52 Beans fresh    26         53 Black beans (Njahi)    27         54 Green grams (Ndengu)    28         55 Soybean    29         56 Peas (incl cowpea, pigeon 
peas, green peas-minji) 
   
        57 Lentils    
        58 Groundnut            59 Cashew nut (korosho)    






Food Items consumed in the 
past 7 DAYS 
How much in 










Total value of 
consumption 
in Kshs      
Food Items consumed in 
the past 7 DAYS 
How much in 










Total value of 
consumption in 
Kshs     
61 Soybean flour    90 Eggs (pieces) with yolk    
 Other pulses and nuts    91 Eggs without yolk    
62     92 Liver (from any animal)    
63     93 Offals (matumbo)    
      Other meats    
 Fruits    94     
64 Orange    95     
65 Ripe mango    96     
66 Ripe pawpaw    97     
67 Pineapple     Dairy products    
68 Apple    98 Milk (cow/goat milk)     
69 Coconut    99 Powdered milk     
70 Guava    100 Sour milk (mala)     
71 Ripe bananas    101 Cheese     
72 Melon       102 Yoghurt       
73 Sugar cane       103 Ice cream      
74 Avocado         Other dairy product       
 Other fruits       104       75         105       
76         106     77          Beverages       
  Meat and animal Products       107 Cocoa powder       78 Cow meat    108 Tea (leaves)       
79 Goat/ Sheep meat       109 Coffee (powder)       
80 Pork       110 Milo powder       
81 Chicken       111 Soya powder       
82 Bush meat (Game meat)       112 Drinking chocolate       
83 Turkey (bata mzinga)         Other beverages       
84 Fish       113        
85 Snail       114         
86 Crabs       115         
87 Chicken sausage       116         
88 Beef sausage               
 Drinks       145 Butter       






Food Items consumed in the 
past 7 DAYS 
How much in 










Total value of 
consumption 
in Kshs      
Food Items consumed in 
the past 7 DAYS 
How much in 










Total value of 
consumption in 
Kshs     
118 
 
Orange juice       147 Sunflower oil       
119 Apple juice       148 Cooking fat       
120 Pineapple juice       149 Other oil(specify)______ 
 
      
121 Other juice (concentrates)    150        122 Local beer    151     123 Bottled beer    152     124 Other beer    153     125 Wine     Snacks     Other drinks    154 Bread    126     155 Biscuit/cookies    
127     156 Popcorn    
128     157 Cakes     Condiments and spices      Other snacks    129 Salt    158     130 Curry    159     131 Ginger (tangawizi)    160     132 Ketchup, Tomato sauce          Other spices___________         133          
134          135          






1= LITER 3= KGS 5= 5 KG. BAG 7= 50 KG. 
BAG 









6= 25 KG. 
BAG 













12.2 Food consumed by household members away from home in the last 7 days (eg in schools, in 
restaurants, during ceremony etc), Household members are the people listed in page 29. 
Mem 
ID 

















        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        









SECTION 13: CHOICE EXPERIMENT-ASSESSING FARMERS’ PREFERENCES FOR 
CONTRACT DESIGN ATTRIBUTES 
 
We are conducting a choice experiment that focuses on the issue of contracts as one of the factors that 
influence farmers’ participation in markets. We will therefore assess farmers’ preference for various 
contracts (oral or written) and their corresponding features. The responses you give here will be 
confidential and will not influence your chances to supply any particular buyer. 
 
We will present three different contract options with features that characterize traditional markets and 
high value markets such as supermarkets, restaurants and institutions. One option will represent 
features of traditional markets while the other two will represent high value markets. 
 
 The traditional market is characterized by sales at farm gate, usually at lower prices, immediate 
cash payments, with sales always possible at any time, and the produce usually sold as harvested. 
High value markets on the other hand are characterized by higher prices of produce sold according to 
pre-specified contractual agreements, written or oral, to supply produce of designated forms (usually 
cleaned and sorted), at designated times, places, and periods of payment (could be delayed by up to 
two weeks) for example, contracts with supermarkets, restaurants and schools . 
 
[Explain the pictures/contract features at this point to the farmer] 
 
Then explain this way: 
 
“I am about to present to you three market options and I request you to choose your most preferred 
option. If you had an option to supply vegetables to any of the following three markets, which one 
would you prefer to supply?” 
 
[Read the 3 options in each of the 6 choice cards sequentially at a time and record the response 
in the table below] 
 
Choices/profiles Choice card No. 
OPTIONS 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Choice 1         
Choice 2         
Choice 3         
Choice 4         
Choice 5         
Choice 6         







Choice Experiment Protocol 
We are conducting a study to better understand farmers’ preferences for vegetable marketing 
contracts with supermarkets. For this purpose, we are carrying out a small experiment, where 
you are asked to choose between different options to market your vegetables. The options will 
differ in terms of prices and other contract conditions. Out of three possible options, you 
should always choose the one that you find most attractive. This is only an experiment, that is, 
the choices you make here will not affect your vegetable marketing conditions in reality. 
Regardless of your answers, you will not have any economic gains or losses. Nevertheless, we 
kindly ask you to consider the options seriously and make your choice as if this were a real 
marketing situation. This will help us to better understand farmers’ preferences and 
constraints. Results from this research can possibly help to make some general 
recommendations about how to improve contract conditions in the future. 
Before starting the experiment, let me explain the main contract attributes in terms of which 
marketing options to choose from will differ. We consider five different contract attributes. 
The first contract attribute refers to the price the buyer will pay per bundle of leafy vegetables 
(kale). Prices in the different marketing options will range from 10 shillings per bundle, which 
is the average price in traditional spot markets (when you sell to buyers without a contract), to 
20 shillings in certain contractual arrangements. 
The second contract attribute is the place of sale, where we consider three possibilities: 
 “Farm gate” means sales to buyers who pick up the produce from your farm, so that 
you would not incur any transportation costs. 
 “Nearby market” means that vegetables would have to be delivered to a specified 
location in the closest town. You would have to organize the transport and carry the 
cost. 
 “Buyers’ premise” means that vegetables would have to be delivered to a specified 
supermarket store in Nairobi (or any other institution in Nairobi purchasing vegetables 
under contract). You would have to organize the transport and carry the cost. 
 





 “Sold as harvested” means that you could sell the vegetables as harvested from the 
plot without any cleaning or sorting, as is common in traditional markets without 
contract. 
 “Sold in washed and sorted form” means that you would have to clean and sort the 
vegetables ready for retail sales, as is common in supermarket contracts. 
 
The fourth contract attribute is the timing of sale, where we consider three possibilities: 
 “Sales possible at any time” means that you could sell whenever you have harvested, 
without any specified time schedule, as is common in traditional markets without 
contract. 
 “Sales at times specified in the contract” means that you would have to sell your 
vegetables according to a time schedule specified in the contract. 
 “Sales based on phone orders by buyer” means that the supermarket (or other 
contractor) would always call you a few days prior to required delivery. That is, the 
contract would not specify exact delivery dates, but you would have to wait for phone 
orders. 
 
The fifth contract attribute is the payment mode, where we consider five possibilities: 
 “Payment immediate, based on quantity delivered” means that you would get the 
payment on the spot, without any delay, for the quantity handed over to the buyer, as 
is common in traditional markets without contract. 
 “Payment delayed, based on quantity delivered” means that you would get the 
payment up to two weeks after product delivery for the quantity handed over to the 
buyer. 
 “Payment delayed, based on quantity buyer sold to customers, physically verifiable by 
farmer” means that you would get the payment up to two weeks after product delivery, 
but possibly not for the total quantity handed over to the buyer. Instead, the buyer 
would only pay you for the quantity that he/she was able to sell to customers. That is, 
you would not be paid for the part of your delivery that remains on the supermarket 
shelve for several days without being purchased by customers. Physical verification 






 “Payment delayed, based on quantity buyer sold to customers, verifiable by farmer 
through barcoding system” means that you would get the payment up to two weeks 
after product delivery and would only be paid for the quantity that the supermarket 
was able to sell to its customers. Verifiable through barcoding system means that you 
would get a computer-generated slip with sold and unsold quantities recorded by a 
barcode scanner. This barcoding system would replace the possibility of physical 
inspection. 
 “Payment delayed, based on quantity buyer sold to customers, not verifiable by 
farmer” means that you would get the payment up to two weeks after product delivery 
and would only be paid for the quantity that the supermarket was able to sell to its 
customers. You would have no option to verify how much of your delivery was 
actually sold to customers but would have to rely on the statements made by the 
supermarket. 
 
In the following, I will present you with choice cards, where each card shows three marketing 
options from which you should choose your preferred one. The first two options always 
reflect contracts with variations in the contract attributes that we just discussed. The third 
option always reflects the situation in the traditional market without contract. Please consider 
the options carefully and choose the one that you feel would be the most lucrative for you to 
sell your vegetables. 
I will sequentially present six choice cards to you, so you will be asked to make six choices, 
one for every card. Please consider each choice card independently from previous cards, that 
is, for each choice please only consider the three options on the present card and do not feel 
influenced by possibly better or worse options you saw on a previous card. 
Now we start (example from Figure 2 in the main article text): 
Option 1: This involves a contract in which you get 20 shillings/bundle of vegetables. The 
vegetables can be sold to the buyer at the farm gate. You can sell in the form as harvested, no 
cleaning and sorting is required. But you can only sell upon receiving phone call orders from 
the buyer. Payment is delayed by up to 2 weeks, and you will only be paid for the quantity 






Option 2: This involves a contract in which you get 14 shillings/bundle of vegetables. The 
vegetables can be sold to the buyer at the farm gate. But you have to wash and sort the 
vegetables before handing them over to the buyer. The timing of sales is specified in the 
contract with concrete dates for each transaction. Payment is delayed by up to 2 weeks, and 
you will only be paid for the quantity that the buyer was actually able to sell to its customers, 
which you can verify physically by inspecting the unsold quantity. 
Option 3: This reflects a typical traditional marketing situation without a contract. You get 10 
shillings/bundle of vegetables. The vegetables can be sold to the buyer at the farm gate. You 
can sell in the form as harvested, no cleaning and sorting is required. You can sell at any time, 
and will receive immediate payment for the quantity handed over to the buyer. 
Out of these three options, please choose your preferred one. 
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